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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 proxy season, lasting from March to June, saw upwards of
437 billion shares voted across more than four thousand shareholder
meetings.1 In 2008, a Delaware attorney stated that proxy contests with
* J.D. Candidate (2019), University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. (2016), Cornell
University. I am grateful to Lawrence Hamermesh for his amazing guidance, comments,
and feedback. A big thank you to my friends and family who relentlessly support me, my
law school professors for consistently challenging me to think on a deeper level, and R.
Richard Geddes for unknowingly guiding my way. All errors are my own.
1. See BROADRIDGE, 2017 Proxy Season Key Statistics and Performance Ratings, http
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election results closer than fifty-five percent to forty-five percent could not
be accurately verified.2 One study of proposals put to a shareholder vote
between 1997 and 2004 found that sixty-four voting results had a margin of
victory less than one percent.3 These facts alone raise the question: can we
rely on shareholder voting given its potential for inaccuracies? Even if we
can more accurately ascertain the results, is it efficient to do so?
Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published their seminal book
outlining the separation of ownership and control in the modern
corporation,4 scholarly literature on the proper role of the shareholder
within the corporation has exploded.5 Some scholars support increasing
shareholder participation6 while others advocate the limitation of the
shareholder franchise as much as possible.7 Nevertheless, the shareholder
franchise continues to be one of the most important topics in corporate
law.8 A well-established principle in corporate governance stems from the
principal-agent problem, and the shareholder vote undoubtedly is meant to
s://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/key-statistics-and-performance-ratings-for-the-2017proxy-season.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B8S-ZRD4].
2. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96
GEO. L.J. 1227, 1279 (2008).
3. Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
159, 161 (2008).
4. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 5-8, 84-90 (1932).
5. For a general overview of the role of shareholders and the rationale behind
shareholder voting, see FRANK D. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 63-89 (1991).
6. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation,
Relationship Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L.
REV. 1443 (1994); William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition,
Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995); Luc
Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of Shareholder Proposals in Corporate
Governance, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 167 (2011) (supporting shareholders’ right to propose new
bylaw amendments and participate heavily in corporate governance).
7. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) (calling
into question the growing focus on shareholder wealth maximization and participation);
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 95 (1986) (stating that shareholding voting is “a
mere ceremony designed to give a veneer of legitimacy to managerial power”); Iman
Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 561,
564 (2006) (promoting the idea that directors use all available power over the firm to avoid
“often conflicting” shareholder interests); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 272-75 (1997) (advocating for the consolidation of corporate control
with the board of directors).
8. See R. Franklin Balotti & Travis Laster, Professor Coates Is Right. Now Please
Study Stockholder Voting, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 837 (2000) (“Stockholder voting is the
central issue in today’s takeover battles.”).
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serve as a check on the board’s managerial power.9 A 2010 report by the
Council of Institutional Investors noted that recent changes in corporate
governance, including the relative increase in proxy battles in lieu of tender
offers, “will place more pressure on voting outcomes.”10
Recognizing the need to improve the underlying proxy machinery that
steers the shareholder voting process, the Securities & Exchange
Commission issued a concept release in July 2010 soliciting feedback on
how to move the plagued system11 into the twenty-first century.12 Yet, with
all the research surrounding the current voting framework, much of the
shareholder voting mechanism remains an outdated product of the preInternet era.13
Vice Chancellor Travis Laster has proffered a solution. In a 2016
speech, noting that “[t]he current system works poorly and harms
stockholders,” Laster posited that distributed ledger technology (“DLT”),
more commonly known as the blockchain, can modernize shareholder
voting and provide a more efficient platform for stockholders to exercise
their franchise.14
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). See Adam Smith,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 439 (1776) (“Like
the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their
master’s honour [sic], and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it.”).
10. Alan L. Beller & Janet L. Fisher, The OBO/NOBO Distinction in Beneficial
Ownership: Implications for Shareholder Communications and Voting (February 2010), http
s://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/02_18_10_obo_nobo_distinction_white_pa
per.pdf [https://perma.cc/75WL-FA5J], at 11.
11. See infra Part I.B.3. For one example of many, see Matt Levine, T. Rowe Price
Voted for the Dell Buyout by Accident, BLOOMBERG VIEW (May 13, 2016, 12:14 PM), https:/
/www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-13/t-rowe-price-voted-for-the-dell-buyout-byaccident [https://perma.cc/6KYR-C8HU] (describing how an error in the current proxy
system caused a large asset manager to vote its block of shares differently than intended); In
re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015) (same).
12. See generally Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-62495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act
Release No. 201340, 98 SEC Docket 3027 (July 14, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/concep
t/2010/34-62495.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X6Y-MM2J] [hereinafter “SEC Concept Release”].
13. See Matt Levine, Absent Regulators and Activist Votes, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov.
17, 2017, 9:40AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-11-17/absent-regulator
s-and-activist-votes [https://perma.cc/8AC7-LKHR] (describing a recent proxy contest
where the vote tabulator “showed up with a wooden table . . . divided into bins; much like
the counting boards used in ancient Mesopotamia. . . . The guy had tabulated things but
there were lots of problems. . . . The CEO and I would trade back and forth until the three of
us agreed on a total we could all live with.”). Ironically, the story described seems eerily
similar to that of the 2000 election, where the margin of victory in the state of Florida was
less than 0.03%. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-01 (2000).
14. J. Travis Laster, Del. Ch., The Block Chain Plunger: Using Technology to Clean
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But how would blockchain technology for shareholder voting work?
Does it fit within the existing regulatory framework? Given the debate
over whether shareholders should even participate in the corporation,
should it be implemented? This Article provides answers to these
questions.
Part I provides an overview of the current shareholder voting regime
in the United States by analyzing shareholders’ ability to vote and the
elaborate structure that has developed to facilitate that process. The section
discusses the relevant ownership principles under the Uniform Commercial
Code and establishes the difference between beneficial and record
ownership. Securities ownership and the proxy voting process are
incredibly complicated in the United States, leading to vote counting errors,
accidentally voted shares, votes that are too close to call, and empty voting.
The section concludes by noting the costs associated with the current
regime and how a monopolistic market favoring proxy advisory firms has
resulted in inefficiencies for shareholders.
Part II introduces the reader to distributed ledger technology and its
associated blockchains. It begins by highlighting the general trend toward
digital corporate governance, specifically the adoption of virtual
shareholder meetings and decentralized autonomous organizations. The
section provides a high level overview of the theoretical and technical
underpinnings of blockchains, followed by a discussion of how the
technology might be integrated into the corporate regime using
permissioned ledgers and voting tokens.
Part III outlines the key arguments for and against implementing
blockchain technology for voting. The section discusses ways the
technology can allow boards to further manipulate an already complex
proxy system, including the use of a rapid voting timeline and as a tool for
greater information disparity. The section also highlights how blockchain’s
massive rise in popularity may lead to its use despite the availability of
other, more traditional technologies. The section continues by analyzing
the efficacy of the shareholder vote in light of the rational apathy and
rational ignorance problems. Theories of the firm are discussed, as well as
managers’ perceived duty to maximize shareholder value. The analysis
concludes with arguments for remaining laissez faire and leaving the
Up Proxy Plumbing and Take Back the Vote, Keynote Speech for the Council of
Institutional Investors (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.cii.org/files/09_29_16_laster_remarks.
pdf [https://perma.cc/93EW-6LPB] [hereinafter “Laster CII Speech”]; see also George S.
Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (2018), (suggesting
that distributed ledger technology—blockchain—may solve many problems stemming from
antiquated securities clearing mechanisms).
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decision of whether to implement distributed ledger technology to the
marketplace.
I. THE CURRENT SHAREHOLDER VOTING REGIME
A. The Shareholder Franchise
At common law, the right of a shareholder to vote at a shareholders’
meeting was “regarded much the same as the right to vote in a political
election—so personal that it could not be delegated.”15 However, as share
ownership began to grow in the early 1900s,16 dispersed stockholders could
not receive quality necessary to make informed voting decisions.17 In
response to the harm caused by securities market practices leading up to the
Great Depression,18 Congress enacted the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 (“the Exchange Act”)19 to restore to shareholders the power they
previously wielded as fully informed voting participants at shareholder
meetings.20 This legislation pushed forth the proxy mechanism, facilitating
shareholders’ ability to delegate their voting power to an agent, usually a
third party nominated by management.21 Since most shareholders no
longer attend company shareholder meetings in person,22 shareholders
exercise their franchise primarily by proxies submitted prior to the meeting.
Issuers of securities registered under the Exchange Act and issuers
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 are required to
comply with federal proxy rules when soliciting proxies from

15. FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 4 (1954).
16. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 47-64 (describing the general growth and
dispersion of stockholders in the 1900s). For example, AT&T saw stockholder growth from
10,000 in 1901 to 642,180 by 1931. Id. at 55.
17. See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1138 (1993) (pointing to geographic dispersion as a hindrance on the
power of shareholder voting).
18. Id.
19. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
20. Fisch, supra note 17, at 1140; see also LOUIS D. GILBERT, DIVIDENDS AND
DEMOCRACY 30-31 (1956) (the Exchange Act was passed “in the belief that shareholders
could not vote effectively until they had adequate information”).
21. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 139 (describing management’s proxy
nominee as a “dummy”).
22. Lisa A. Fontenot, Public Company Virtual-Only Annual Meetings, 73 BUS. LAW.
35, 35 (2018) (noting that most shareholders no longer attend shareholder meetings in
person and even institutional investors face attendance difficulties stemming from a
multitude of meetings over a short span each spring).
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shareholders.23 Thus, the corporate proxy has become “the forum for
shareholder suffrage.”24
Shareholders’ right to vote is primarily a product of state law and
stock exchange rules. Under Delaware law, shareholders vote to elect a
board of directors;25 effect changes to the bylaws;26 and approve mergers,27
sales of substantially all or all assets,28 and amendments to the
corporation’s certificate of incorporation.29 Delaware has traditionally
supported the shareholder franchise30 and recent case law provides further
incentives for corporations to maximize their use of shareholder votes.31
Moreover, the Model Business Corporation Act respects the fundamental
importance of shareholder voting to elect directors and approve major
changes.32 The New York Stock Exchange likewise requires shareholder
approval for transactions involving the issuance of stock that increases the
number of outstanding shares by twenty percent or more.33 In other, more
limited circumstances, shareholders have the ability to proffer and vote on
proposals at the annual shareholder’s meeting.34

23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 270.20a-1 (2014); SEC Concept Release,
supra note 12, at *11.
24. Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 216.
26. Id. § 109.
27. Id. § 251(c).
28. Id. § 271.
29. Id. § 242(b).
30. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(applying a higher standard of review for actions by the board with the primary purpose of
interfering with the shareholder franchise); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118
(Del. 2003) (affirming Blasius).
31. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (applying
great deference to an informed, affirmative vote of a majority of shareholders); Kahn v.
M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (providing a cleansing effect via business
judgment review for self-interested transactions if approved by an affirmative vote of a
majority of the minority shareholders).
32. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01 and 7.21.
33. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014). This right is often limited under a number of
exceptions. The most prominent is the so-called ordinary business doctrine, which prevents
shareholders from voting on proposals that fall within the “ordinary business operations” of
a corporation. See, e.g., HP Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2016 WL 6819133, at *1 (Dec. 28,
2016) (granting no enforcement action protection to HP and concluding that selection of
venue for annual shareholder meetings constitutes ordinary business operations).
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B. Proxy Voting Machinery
1. Complexity of Ownership
The U.S. proxy system can be described as nothing less than overly
complex. This complexity stems from a system of share ownership where
intermediaries such as banks and broker-dealers hold almost all securities.35
Although this system supports quick and relatively accurate clearance and
settlement of securities transactions, it adds “significant complexity to the
proxy voting process.”36 The current state of proxy voting creates a need
for an array of third parties, including brokers, banks, custodians, securities
depositories, transfer agents, proxy solicitors, proxy service providers,
proxy advisory firms, and vote tabulators.37 These third parties are often,
and rightfully, seen as an impediment to the efficiency of the proxy
machine, creating additional expenses and more opportunities for error
along the way.38
Since the proxy solicitation process begins by determining who has
the right to vote on matters presented at shareholders meetings,39 it is
important to discuss in greater detail the way shares are owned under the
U.S. system. From the founding of the stock exchange on Wall Street
through the mid-1970s, clerks and messengers hand delivered stock
certificates between buyers and sellers to execute trades.40 This arcane
mechanism was inefficient, arguably slowed the growth of American
capital markets, and even forced the stock markets to close on Wednesdays
for traders to catch up on paperwork.41 Finally, in 1975 Congress amended
35. FINAL REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PRACTICE OF
RECORDING THE OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES IN THE RECORDS OF THE ISSUER IN OTHER THAN
THE NAME OF THE BENEFICIAL OWNER OF SUCH SECURITIES PURSUANT TO SECTION 12(M) OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Dec. 3, 1976 [hereinafter “SEC Report on
Ownership of Securities”].
36. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *8.
37. Id.
38. See generally Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate
Governance Industry: The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 384 (2009).
39. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *11.
40. David C. Donald, The Rise and Effects of the Indirect Holding System: How
Corporate America Ceded its Shareholders to Intermediaries, Johann Wolfgang GoetheUniversitat, Institute for Law and Finance, Working Paper No. 68, 9-10 (2007), http://publik
ationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2007/4885/pdf/ILF_WP_068.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5
RD-5FTL].
41. See Wyatt Wells, The Remaking of Wall Street, 1967 to 1971, 74 BUS. HIST. REV.
193, 201 (2000) (noting that the slow process caused several exchanges in the U.S. to limit
their trading hours); FINRA, When Paper Paralyzed Wall Street: Remembering the 1960s
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the Exchange Act to require the immobilization of all exchange-traded
securities held by banks and brokers for their clients.42 Securities,
including stock certificates, were to be held in “street name” in a central
depository with share transfers recorded akin to book entry style
accounting, thereby eliminating many of the logjams of the hand-to-hand
paper system.43 Now, about eighty-five percent of shares are held in “street
name” by banks, brokers, and other intermediaries.44 Essentially, “street
name” means that certificates representing shares bear the names of
financial intermediaries in lieu of the beneficial owners as a means to ease
the transfer process.45 Shares are then deposited with the Depository Trust
and Clearing Corporation (“DTCC”),46 which keeps track of who owns
them using electronic bookkeeping.47 As of 2008, DTCC held securities
worth more than $40 trillion in street name.48 Important to many state laws
and federal proxy regulations, DTCC’s affiliate Cede & Co. is the
shareholder of record on the issuing company’s stock register.49
Although this system of ownership greatly facilitates the efficiency of
trading and clearing in the public marketplace, these benefits come at the
cost of obfuscating beneficial ownership of those shares. The true
beneficial owner of the equitable title is often not the record shareholder
that state corporation law recognizes. For example, in Delaware the
corporation’s stock ledger is the only evidence as to who the company’s
stockholders are and this stock ledger determines who may vote.50 Access
Paperwork Crisis (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.finra.org/investors/when-paper-paralyzedwall-street-remembering-1960s-paperwork-crisis [https://perma.cc/722B-LFQJ] (describing
how piles of certificates caused stock markets to close on Wednesdays).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(e) (2012) (as amended in 1975, § 17A(e) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934).
43. Id.; Donald, supra note 40, at 10.
44. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics
(May 23, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm [https://p
erma.cc/394Z-J8C7].
45. Why are Securities Held ‘In Street Name’?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedi
a.com/ask/answers/185.asp [https://perma.cc/3GJW-PAXL].
46. DTCC provides a broad range of settlement and clearing activities while most
securities transfers are handled by its subsidiaries The Depository Trust Co. (“DTC”) and
Cede & Co. (“Cede”). DTC, http://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/dtc [htt
ps://perma.cc/YFN6-YQF9].
47. See generally Settlement & Asset Services, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/settlementand-asset-services [https://perma.cc/V2BR-5DUE].
48. See Larry Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code, 26
FLA. ST. L. REV. 285, 315 (1999) (estimating that as much as seventy or eighty percent of
shares of public companies are held by DTCC and its subsidiaries).
49. Id.
50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 219(c) (providing that the corporation’s stock ledger is the
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to the appraisal remedy, a hot topic of corporate law today, is also affected
by the distinction between record and beneficial ownership since only a
record holder may perfect appraisal rights.51 There are narrow exceptions,
however, where the Delaware courts have been more flexible on the
distinction between record and beneficial owners.52 Moreover, the
consequences appear conflated when considering that both record owners
and beneficial owners may bring suit for actions challenging the validity of
a contested election of directors.53 Understanding the nuances of what
actions record owners may take vis-à-vis beneficial owners can be
challenging, but Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code steps in to
provide the roadmap for deciphering underlying property issues: the holder
of shares in street name has a “security entitlement” in a “financial asset.”54
That entitlement is not a claim to specific property; it represents the right to
enforce a claim against the intermediary (e.g., broker or bank) to deliver all
property rights associated with the shares.55 The beneficial owner holds a
pro rata claim against the intermediary’s holdings, and it is immaterial
whether the intermediary actually owns sufficient shares to cover the
claims.56 The resulting indirect holding system not only partially hides the
only evidence as to who are the stockholders); see also Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d
482, 494 (Del. 1989) (holding that record ownership is the definitive factor in determining
who may vote).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262 (allowing “record owners” to exercise appraisal rights);
In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *3 (Del.
Ch. May 2, 2007) (“Only the record holder possesses and may perfect appraisal rights. The
statute simply does not allow consideration of the beneficial owner in this context.”). More
recently, record ownership played a large part in the Dell appraisal litigation in which a
shareholder lost the ability to seek appraisal because the record holder, DTCC, transferred a
beneficial owners’ shares to a new record owner, thereby resulting in a failure to satisfy the
statute’s continuous ownership requirement. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 262(a), 262(h)
(providing that the word “stockholder means a holder of record of stock in a corporation”);
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015); see also
Laster CII Speech, supra note 14 (“Constrained by the law, I held they lost standing to seek
appraisal . . . . Personally, I think that is absurd.”). Laster goes on to note that the record
ownership distinction caused the shareholder to lose the ability to collect interest for the
capital represented by those shares, again indicating the economic importance at play. Id.
52. See, e.g., Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. Saks, 122 A.2d 120 (Del. 1956) (holding that
proof of record ownership is not required to maintain a derivative action); see also R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.10 (2007) (“An equitable owner of shares is considered a
stockholder and may maintain a derivative action.”).
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 225; Rosenfield v. Standard Elec. Equip. Corp., 83 A.2d
843, 845 (Del. Ch. 1951).
54. UCC § 8-501(b); id. § 8-102(a)(9) (stating that financial assets include shares).
55. Id. § 8-503(b).
56. Id.; id. § 8-501(c)-(e); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1240-43 (describing
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owner’s identity but also obscures the quantity owned. Although
corporation law views a shareholder as owner of a determinate number of
shares, under Article 8 the shareholder legally owns only a pro rata interest
in a fungible mass of securities that the broker holds.57 This regime allows
a brokerage customer to become an entitlement holder even if the
intermediary has not yet acquired the shares to be credited to the
customer’s account, and even if the intermediary does not own a single
share.58 Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock, both currently at New York
University Law School, claim that holding in “fungible bulk” leads to a
misalignment of property rights and is among the chief causes of voting
errors.59
As a result of the “fungible bulk” approach, DTCC does not handle
the allocation of its shares to individual clients. Rather, a layer of
intermediaries exists to aid both institutional and retail investors in
navigating the share ownership machine.60 DTCC keeps track of the
owners, but the intermediaries must discern how to allocate the shares they
hold among their clients. The multitude of layers means that trades take
about two to three days before they are fully cleared.61 Throughout the
trade, DTCC remains the record owner and the specific securities traded
are not even recognized as being traded within their own systems.62 Thus,
the corporation’s list of record holders never changes throughout the
entirety of the process, rendering it relatively useless for identifying the
company’s beneficial owners for the purposes of voting.63

the relevant UCC provisions in detail and noting the bevy of problems this immateriality
causes).
57. UCC § 8-503; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting
Mechanics (May 23, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.ht
m [https://perma.cc/MDW3-KRV7]; see also Laster CII Speech, supra note 14 (“Ironically,
at the same time that Delaware corporate law assumes that each stockholder directly owns a
specific number of shares, Delaware’s version of Article 8 treats each stockholder as own a
pro rata interest in the fungible bulk.”).
58. Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1242.
59. Id. at 1243 (“The misalignment between the property rights implicit in the
beneficial-owner-as-shareholder paradigm and the property concepts from Article 8 comes
to the fore in the problem of overvoting”).
60. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 12 (highlighting that the majority of
participants in DTCC are brokers and banks, numbering approximately 400); see also DTC
Member Directories, DTCC, http://www.dtcc.com/client-center/dtc-directories [https://perm
a.cc/BE3P-5S7Y] (providing detailed lists of DTCC’s clients).
61. Geis, supra note 14 at 234.
62. Id.; Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1238-40.
63. Kevin Kearney, Note, Proxy.gov: A Proposal to Modernize Shareholder Lists and
Simplify Shareholder Communications, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 391, 395 (2015).
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2. Proxy Distribution and the Voting Process
Most shareholders no longer attend annual shareholder meetings and
require a method for their shares to be voted.64 This method is governed at
both the federal and state levels. Generally speaking, the federal proxy
rules have four main components: (1) provisions requiring adequate
disclosure to keep shareholders informed; (2) rules requiring elaborate
disclosures in the event of a contested proxy fight; (3) a general prohibition
against using false or misleading statements; and (4) provisions allowing
shareholders to communicate with others by placing a proposal in the proxy
statement.65
To facilitate the federal process, issuers of securities are often required
under state law to maintain a record of all security holders to make this
process more efficient.66 Most corporations lack experience and resources
to do so and hire outside transfer agents to maintain that record.67 Since
record holders must vote shares in accordance with beneficial owners’
instructions, record holders and intermediaries must seek out these transfer
agents to discern the beneficial owners of the corporation’s shares so they
can fulfill the requirements under SEC rules that proxies reach beneficial
owners in a timely and effective manner.68 Issuers also need to contact
intermediaries to request the number of proxies and voting materials
necessary to align with their shareholdings.69 To that end, intermediaries
traditionally hire a proxy service provider who forwards proxy materials by
mail or electronically.70 Currently, a single proxy service provider handles
over ninety-eight percent of the market for proxy vote processing in the
United States. Recognizing this pseudo monopolistic market, major stock
exchanges have capped the amount that firms such as Broadridge can
charge listed companies for proxy related services.71 In order to permit
64. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
65. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 82.
66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219(a).
67. See SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *21.
68. See SEC Rule 14A-4(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(3) (2015) (providing that shares be
voted in accordance with beneficial owner’s instructions); Freeman v. Fabniak, No. Civ. A.
8034, 1985 WL 11583 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 1985) (holding that allowing a record holder to
vote shares contrary to the beneficial owner’s wishes is inequitable).
69. This process is required under Exchange Act Rule 14a-13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13
(2015); see Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1244.
70. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (requiring issuers to provide beneficial owners with
proxy cards, annual reports, and a proxy statement highlighting essential information
necessary for an informed vote); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 222 (requiring similar information
to be sent to shareholders).
71. See Proxy Policies and Insights, BROADRIDGE, https://www.broadridge.com/financi
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beneficial owners to vote, intermediaries—via Broadridge acting on their
behalf—must provide them with a request for voting instructions.72 When
the beneficial owner completes these voting instructions, an elaborate
agency relationship is created where the intermediaries and record owners
must vote shares in accordance with their clients’ wishes.73 Importantly,
however, courts have repeatedly held that the beneficial owner bears the
risk of any errors made by the proxy holder during the course of voting.74
A final topic on voting will be covered here, as it is relevant to the
accuracy of votes: vote tabulation. Once corporations receive votes, state
laws dictate that a vote tabulator or inspector of election must be hired to
officially collect and count both proxy votes and votes delivered by
shareholders in person at a meeting.75 The tabulator holds the ultimate
responsibility for determining that each registered owner has submitted the
correct number of votes and that the vote tally is accurate.76 But often,
many intermediaries will submit to the vote tabulator more votes than they
are entitled to cast, forcing the tabulator to either accept votes on a first-in
basis or to simply not accept any proxy votes from the erring intermediaries
at all.77
al-services/asset-management/institutional-investors/enhance-and-simplify-portfoliomanagement/proxy-policies-and-insights [https://perma.cc/5MMG-LY9B] (emphasizing
Broadridge’s market domination); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 451.90, 465
(articulating fees that proxy service providers may charge).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1(b)(2)-(3). See R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN,
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 10.7 (3d ed. 2017).
73. See Hauth v. Giant Portland Cement Co., 96 A.2d 233, 235 (Del. Ch. 1953)
(holding that the proxy holder has a fiduciary obligation to carry out owners’ wishes).
74. See Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1354-55 (Del. 1987) (noting that since
holding shares in street name is voluntary, shareholder must bear the risk of holding their
shares through nominees); Am. Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 136 A.2d 690, 692
(Del. 1957) (determining that the shareholder bears the risk of any failure by a broker to
fulfill voting instructions); Mainiero v. Microbyx Corp., 699 A.2d 320, 324 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(shareholder holding shares in any other way than as the record owner assumes the risk); see
also Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994) (settling Delaware law that the
beneficial owner is not entitled to relief if the proxy holder errs in voting). For a more
recent example, see In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2015 WL 4313206 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015)
(referring to an instance where a proxy holder incorrectly voted in favor of a merger,
causing the shareholder to forfeit access to the appraisal remedy).
75. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 231; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.29.
76. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *24; see also Frank J. Obara, Jr., The
Counting and Reporting of the Vote, Including the Role of Inspectors of Elections, in R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI, JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN & GREGORY P. WILLIAMS, MEETINGS OF
STOCKHOLDERS § 10-3 (1995) (commenting that in a fair and honest corporate election
someone should attest to the accuracy of the vote tabulation).
77. This error is often called “over-voting.” SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at
*26; see also John C. Wilcox, Shareholder Nominations of Corporate Directors:
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3. Issues and Mistakes with Current Voting Mechanisms
Why is it important to know how proxy voting currently works?
Simply put, the machinery causes problems. Let’s begin by discussing the
problem of over-voting touched upon in the preceding section. The
complex securities ownership and voting structure fails to account for
many of the intricacies of our modern financial system, including margin
lending and high frequency trading. Brokers often allow their customers to
purchase securities on margin, thereby lending them shares that they
already own in fungible bulk. However, the broker doesn’t really own the
shares, rather, she holds them for another client. Given that the standard
stock loan agreement transfers the right to vote to the borrower, the
broker’s client may have had their right to vote transferred to the borrowing
client.78 Neither the initial beneficial owner nor the borrower becomes
aware of the vote transaction since the broker does not match the loaned
shares with any particular margin customer, and consequently both clients
fill out voter instruction forms and submit them to their brokers for vote
execution.79
Critics of the current system believe that over-voting is an indication
that brokers are not doing enough to determine who is actually entitled to
vote when a margin transaction has occurred. But in an attempt to fix these
issues, brokers have adopted several different, yet rather rudimentary,
methods of reconciling the additional votes by assigning the total number
of shares they are eligible to vote on a pro rata basis to their customers
either prior to or after proxies are mailed. Some brokers do not even
attempt to assign votes pro rata and simply “reduce the number” of their
total votes cast.80 Again, it is ultimately the vote tabulator who must
determine if the number of votes cast aligns with the company’s
stockholder register, providing the chance for human error. Since the

Unintended Consequences and the Case for Reform of the U.S. Proxy System, in
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT 6 (Lucian A. Bebchuk ed., 2004); see
also Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1255-63 (elaborately describing the ways over-voting
can occur)..
78. Master Securities Lending Agreement at 6, https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploa
ds/2017/06/MSLA_Master-Securities-Loan-Agreement-2017-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NE69-CMHZ]; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting
Mechanics, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm [https://perm
a.cc/A6B9-WDDK].
79. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Briefing Paper: Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics, ht
tps://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm [https://perma.cc/A6B9-W
DDK]
80. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *32.
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voting inspector’s determination is presumed correct under law, the only
way to challenge the result is to bring a shareholder suit.81
Still, a more prevalent problem with rudimentary voting structures
occurs during the actual counting of the vote and determining the accuracy
of such a count. Consider the recent proxy contest at Procter & Gamble
(“P&G”), where activist investor Nelson Peltz stirred the pot by competing
with incumbent directors for a seat on the company’s board. Initially, it
appeared that Peltz was unsuccessful, and P&G claimed victory by a tally
of about six million votes out of more than two billion cast.82 However,
Peltz’s fund Trian Partners was quick to challenge that number and
demanded a recount by an independent proxy tabulator, asserting that the
vote was actually “too close to call.”83 After a recount that lasted more
than a month, Peltz turned out to be the victor—winning by a mere 42,780
votes, a margin of 0.0016%!84 Out of billions of votes it came down to just
a few thousand, many of which might not have been accurately voted as a
result of the layers of intermediaries interposed between the beneficial
owners and the voters of record. Unsurprisingly, while this may be an
extreme example of a proxy contest won by the narrowest of margins,
shareholders are waging more and more proxy fights as activists gain more
clout within the investor community.85 In 2008, during a proxy fight for
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 225, 227.
82. Procter & Gamble Co., Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders (Form
8-K) (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/80424/00011931251731102
8/d451432d8k.htm [https://perma.cc/NZF5-W68H].
83. Trian Says Procter & Gamble Vote Too Close to Call, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 10, 2017,
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171010006248/en/ [https://perma.cc/2YPA-U
582].
84. David Benoit & Sharon Terlep, Activist Peltz Narrowly Wins P&G Board Seat,
New Count Shows, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-nelso
n-peltz-elected-to-p-g-board-1510782775 [https://perma.cc/XYG6-VP2Q].
85. See Jay Frankl and Steve Balet, The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-ris
e-of-settled-proxy-fights/ [https://perma.cc/3EF8-6EB7] (demonstrating that there were 110
hostile proxy fights in 2016, a forty-three percent increase since 2012); see also RANDALL S.
THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON, ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL § 1.01 (3d ed. 1998) (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1141 (Del. 1989) (pointing to the ability of the board of directors to “justsay-no” to poison pill redemption as a primary reason for a shift toward proxy fights as a
method of achieving corporate control); Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker,
Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, Uncontested Director
Elections and Management Proposals: A Review of the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L.
REV. 9, 15 (2017) (commenting that one cause of the rise of activists stems from new
internal regulations by large pension funds forcing them to vote in every board election).
For more on activist investors and their role in corporate governance, see generally Frank
Partnoy, US Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 99-
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the control of Yahoo!’s board, the company announced that it had received
approval for its slate of directors from eighty percent of stockholders.
However, a major error occurred: Broadridge misattributed about twenty
percent of the vote because it failed to include millions of votes in its final
tally.86 Although the error in this proxy battle was not outcomedeterminative, it serves as a reminder of just how consequential these errors
can become. These examples illustrate that it is not a matter of if an error
like this will happen again, but when.
Although the vote tabulator’s word is supposed to be taken as
gospel,87 vote tabulators are often incorrect and far from infallible. In the
now famous—or infamous, depending on one’s stance on appraisal
arbitrage—case of In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., the election director
certified that shareholders had approved Transkaryotic’s merger with Shire
Pharmaceuticals by a 2.6% margin.88 However, the record indicated
disputes of fact as to the validity of proxies amounting to a greater number
of votes than the merger itself was approved by.89 In another instance, the
tabulator failed to record more than three million votes due to a minor
technical error. 90 And in the case of Seidman & Associates v. G.A.
Financial, the Chancery Court was forced to invalidate more than 230,000
proxies because the tabulator was not able to resolve an over-vote of a mere
824 shares.91 Note that vote tabulators are not without mechanisms to solve
problems stemming from over-voting and may respond with a variety of
vote counting procedures, including counting votes on a first-in-first-voted
or last-in-first-voted basis, or disregarding altogether a vote submitted by a
broker dealer.92 Nevertheless, given human error we should be reluctant to
place so much power with a single referee. These examples illustrate that

113 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
86. Yi-Wyn Yen, Yahoo Recount Shows Large Protest: Yang’s Approval At 66 Not 85
Percent, HUFFINGTON POST Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/06/yaho
o-recount-shows-large_n_117195.html [https://perma.cc/TW7P-XT3J].
87. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
88. 954 A.2d 346, 375-78 (Del. Ch. 2008). Recall that a prominent Delaware attorney
stated that “in a contest that is closer than fifty-five to forty-five percent, there is no
verifiable answer to the question ‘who won?’” Kahan & Rock, supra note 2, at 1279
(quoting A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Partner, Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware).
89. In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d at 375-78.
90. See In re Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc., No. Civ. A. 4602-CC (Del. Ch. June 12,
2009) (ordering an election inspector to reopen voting after failing to account for votes).
91. 837 A.2d 21, 24-28 (Del. Ch. 2003).
92. In re Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., NYSE Decision 05-45, para. 11 (Feb. 2,
2006).
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the errors are not trivial—they matter.93
It is not just the vote tabulator and narrow margins that are the
problem: the underlying system is to blame more than anything else.94
Recall the now-well-known 2003 proxy contest at Unilever. The voter
turnout appeared outrageously low, so the company inquired as to why its
shareholders did not vote in force on a very important proxy contest.
Following the investigation, it was discovered that three of Unilever’s
largest stockholders did not have their votes executed by their voting
intermediary because Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) had
improperly filed its voting cards. In this way, more than twelve million
votes were “lost.”95
Empty voting, where the shareholder vote is separated from the
beneficial owner, is another problem stemming from the inability to
ascertain individual owners.96 Simply by paying a fee to borrow shares, the
borrowing investor can “buy” votes without owning the corresponding
economic interest.97 In the United States the practice is limited by
Regulation T, under which securities loaned by institutional investors
through their broker-dealers are restricted to distinct “permitted purposes,”
such as execution of a short sale.98
93. See United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 388 (1944) (indicating that accurate vote
counting is fundamental to democracy).
94. See Levine, supra note 11 (noting that since T. Rowe Price’s shares were voted
incorrectly in favor of Dell’s management buyout plan, the firm missed out on millions in
interest payments stemming from an appraisal action since they never had standing to bring
a claim).
95. Adam Jones, Riddle of the Missing Unilever Votes Solved, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2003, at A1; Voting Integrity: Practices for Investors and the Global Proxy Advisory
Industry, Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance, Yale School of
Management, Policy Briefing No. 3 at 11 (2009), http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/defaul
t/files/microsites/millstein-center/Voting%20Integrity%20Policy%20Briefing%20No%203
%2002%2027%2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3LL-VCYL].
96. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty
Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006); Henry T. C. Hu
& Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008). But see Susan E. K. Christoffersen, Christopher
C. Geczy, David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, Vote Trading and Information Aggregation,
62 J. FIN. 2897 (2007) (noting that informed investors could potentially improve electoral
outcomes through empty voting by taking long economic positions, acquiring
disproportionate voting power from less informed shareholders, and casting votes that are
more informed and thus more likely to contribute to shareholder value).
97. Kara Scannell, Outside Influence: How Borrowed Shares Swing Company Votes –
SEC and Others Fear Hedge-Fund Strategy May Subvert Elections, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2007, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116978080268188623 [https://perma.cc/F2KM-SH6
H].
98. Federal Reserve Board Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (2014).

722

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:3

Investors can easily manipulate the loopholes in Regulation T and the
current regulatory apparatus to shield their holdings from the rest of the
marketplace by using a combination of equity derivatives and synthetic
transactions. In a classic example, Mylan Laboratories, Inc. sought to
acquire King Pharmaceuticals in 2004.99 At the time of the announcement,
hedge fund Perry Corporation owned a large stake in King, but hedged its
position by shorting Mylan shares to protect itself from a fall in Mylan’s
stock price.100 As was the case here, an investor may make a profit by
borrowing stock from a lender, selling it to others at a higher price, and
then buying the stock at a lower price in the future to return to the initial
lender. Perry accumulated nearly ten percent of Mylan’s outstanding
shares, then entered into equity swaps to protect itself from a drop in
Mylan’s stock price. In this manner, Perry created an empty voting
position allowing it to vote Mylan’s shares in opposition to the merger
without any economic repercussions or real stake in the result.101 Five
years after this incident, the SEC settled an enforcement action against
Perry for failing to disclose its purchase of over five percent of Mylan stock
even though the position was achieved via a swap arrangement instead of
direct ownership.102 The hope, evidently, was to put hedge funds that
engaged in these questionable activities on notice.
Apart from these voting errors and manipulations, the proxy
mechanism is also expensive for shareholders. It is estimated that markets
for shares of publicly traded companies annually generate upwards of $100
billion in post-trade and securities servicing fees.103 Moreover, issuers
themselves pay more than $200 million per year just to communicate with
stockholders—and that figure does not even include printing or postage
fees.104 For an example, the base mailing fee for each beneficial owner for

99. Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Perry Corp. With Disclosure
Violations in Vote Buying Scheme, (Jul. 21, 2009) https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/20
09-165.htm [https://perma.cc/YN5F-VNLV].
100. Latham & Watkins M&A Deal Commentary, “Empty Voting” and other Fault
Lines Undermining Shareholder Democracy: The New Hunting Ground for Hedge Funds
(2007), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub1878_1.Commentary.Empty.Votin
g.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE44-3NCB].
101. Charles M. Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing
and Institutional Voting (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub34
63_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS94-HADT].
102. ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 370 (2d ed. 2010).
103. Blockchain in Capital Markets: The Prize and the Journey, OLIVER WYMAN at 20
(February 2016), http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/f
eb/BlockChain-In-Capital-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/99SN-BS9L].
104. Kearney, supra note 60, at 398.
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situations when there is not an opposing proxy is $0.40.105 While the
NYSE and other exchanges cap these fees,106 Broadridge unsurprisingly
uses its monopoly power to charge the maximum amount allowable under
such rules.107 Unsurprisingly, companies have not been sitting around
doing nothing about the costs of the proxy mechanism. In fact, the charges
associated with shareholder voting have been “[o]ne of the most persistent
concerns . . . expressed to the [SEC’s] staff.”108 As Vice Chancellor Laster
puts it,
The voting and stockholder infrastructure is complicated. The
costs of that complexity fall on stockholders. One type of cost is
uncertainty as to voting. . . . Another type of cost is financial.
Stockholders pay for the system. The folks who run the system
are not affected by the election results and are generating profits
in a non-competitive environment. Change will have to come
from the outside.109
II. BLOCKCHAIN AS A SOLUTION
A. Digital Trends in Corporate Governance
Blockchain. The word itself seems to be the hottest one around these
days—simply adding it to a company’s name creates nearly unparalleled
enthusiasm followed shortly by a massive bump in stock price.110 Since
Satoshi Nakamoto’s foundational paper describing Bitcoin, the technology
105. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual, Supplementary Material to § 465.20.
106. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *21.
107. Id. at *51-55; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PROXY WORKING GROUP TO
THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 23 (June 5, 2006), http://www.shareholdercoalition.com/s
ites/default/files/NYSE%20Proxy%20Working%20Grp%20Rpt%206-5-2006.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/243Y-B3W8].
108. SEC Concept Release, supra note 12, at *50.
109. Laster CII Speech, supra note 14.
110. See Arie Schapira & Kailey Leinz, Long Island Iced Tea Soars After Changing Its
Name to Long Blockchain, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-21/crypto-craze-sees-long-island-iced-tea-rename-as-long-blockchain [http
s://perma.cc/ZM6D-KKXZ] (reporting how Long Island Iced Tea Corp.’s stocks soared by
as much as 289% after changing its name to Long Blockchain Corp). Popular late night
television host John Oliver has since provided great commentary on the buzz surrounding
blockchain. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast Mar. 11,
2018). The mania surrounding blockchain and cryptocurrencies has even spurred an entire
language of slang used by enthusiasts. See Stephanie Yang, Want to Keep Up With Bitcoin
Enthusiasts? Learn the Lingo, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/want-to-keep-up-with-bitcoin-enthusiasts-learn-the-lingo-1517394601 [https://perm
a.cc/9G8Z-HE9W] (describing words such as hodl, goxed, shilling, and bitshaming).
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has grown tremendously in popularity.111 The notion of blockchain, or
distributed ledger technology (“DLT”), is exciting not only because it
marks a true technological innovation in cryptography and computer
coding but also because it can be widely applied across nearly every
industry.112
Recently, the securities industry has discovered DLT’s useful
functionality as a secure method of transacting. In 2017, DTCC began a
program geared toward using DLT to eventually settle the trading of certain
types of credit derivative securities.113 DTCC sees this embrace of
blockchain technology as creating many possible cost savings for both
itself and industry members.114 Elsewhere, Australia’s securities markets
are attempting to settle the actual trading of stocks using DLT115 and an

111. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008)
(unpublished manuscript), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/59BH-D9B2].
While Nakamoto is often credited with creating the concept of the blockchain, the initial
idea was planted as early as 1991. See Stuart Haber & W. Scott Stornetta, How to TimeStamp a Digital Document, 3 J. CRYPTOLOGY 99, 99 (1991) (suggesting a method of time
stamping to ascertain ownership of intellectual property).
112. See Steven Johnson, Beyond the Bitcoin Bubble, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/magazine/beyond-the-bitcoin-bubble.html [https://per
ma.cc/BJ8X-2RAC] (noting that “[a]ll the focus on Bitcoin as a payment system may
similarly prove to be a distraction, a technological red herring”); Rob Marvin, Blockchain:
The Invisible Technology That’s Changing The World, PCMAG (Aug. 29, 2017, 1:38 PM), h
ttps://www.pcmag.com/article/351486/blockchain-the-invisible-technology-thats-changing-t
he-wor [https://perma.cc/PAA7-T55M] (describing how DLT could be used in every digital
transaction and major industry reactions to it); see also Anoop Nannra, Blockchain and a
Safer Self-Driving Future, CISCO BLOGS (Jan. 19, 2018), https://blogs.cisco.com/innovation/
blockchain-and-a-safer-self-driving-future [https://perma.cc/B77W-8KZ3] (advocating for
using blockchain in industries as specialized as autonomous vehicles).
113. See Laura Shin, DTCC Partners With IBM, Startups For Blockchain-Based Credit
Default Swaps Solution, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laur
ashin/2017/01/09/dtcc-selects-partners-for-blockchain-solution-for-credit-default-swaps/#4b
92e7d05061 [https://perma.cc/4CVP-ZJPE] (announcing DTCC’s development of DLT in
the credit default swap market); Press Release, DTCC, DTCC Selects IBM, AXONI and R3
to Develop DTCC’s Distributed Ledger Solution for Derivatives Processing (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.dtcc.com/news/2017/january/09/dtcc-selects-ibm-axoni-and-r3-to-developdtccs-distributed-ledger-solution
[https://perma.cc/7RG7-QBS2]
(announcing
key
partnerships with innovative technology companies that displays DTCC’s long-term
investment in blockchain).
114. See Michael del Castillo, $11 Trillion Bet: DTCC to Process Derivatives with
Blockchain Tech, COINDESK (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/11-trillion-bet-dtcc-cl
ear-derivatives-blockchain-tech/ [https://perma.cc/5ETR-TR2T] (quoting the CEO of
DTCC’s derivatives subsidiary concerning internal cost savings).
115. David Meyer, The Australian Securities Exchange Just Made Blockchain History,
FORTUNE (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/blockchain-technology-australian-se
curities-exchange-asx/ [https://perma.cc/K6SA-EJUH].
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Estonian stock exchange began using DLT for shareholder voting in
2016.116 Outside the realm of securities, blockchain has been suggested as
a means for all areas requiring voting mechanisms117 to solve many
problems of voter inaccuracies and avoid a need for recounts in close
elections.118 As scholars begin to embrace blockchain technology as a
possible innovation in the world of securities trading clearance and
shareholder voting, perhaps its adoption is not as far off as one might
think.119 In fact, at a recent hearing on Capitol Hill, SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton opined that the technology underlying cryptocurrencies (DLT)
could be very valuable if utilized in securities clearing.120
The shift toward using technology to aid in corporate governance is
far from revolutionary and there is a general trend toward digitalizing many
traditional regimes. In 2000, recognizing the Internet as providing a forum
that could lessen expenses incurred by companies at their annual
116. See Anna Irrera, Nasdaq Successfully Completes Blockchain Test in Estonia,
REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/nasdaq-blockchain/nasd
aq-successfully-completes-blockchain-test-in-estonia-idUSL1N1FA1XK [https://perma.cc/5
YFQ-H8BM] (announcing NASDAQ’s successful use of a blockchain voting platform with
its Estonian affiliate exchange).
117. See, e.g., Phillip Boucher, What If Blockchain Technology Revolutionised Voting?,
EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. (Sept. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etu
des/ATAG/2016/581918/EPRS_ATA%282016%29581918_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV5
X-7JUY] (describing how blockchain could be applied to e-voting to increase efficiency);
Danny Bradbury, How Blockchain Could Usher in Digital Democracy, COINDESK (June 16,
2014, 11:05 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/block-chain-technology-digital-democracy/ [htt
ps://perma.cc/A7YC-W9UU] (providing ways blockchain could aid in Internet voting
without compromising security).
118. See Ben Kamisar, What’s Next in the Pa. Special Election Ballot Fight, THE HILL
(Mar. 18, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/378864-whats-next-in-th
e-undecided-pa-special-election [https://perma.cc/T6Q6-544N] (pointing out the extensive
appeals and recount process in a recent congressional election). See generally Sean Richey,
Random and Systematic Error in Voting in Presidential Elections, 66 POL. RES. Q. 645
(2013) (providing statistical evidence that voting error may have caused the wrong
candidate to become elected in three of the last nine US presidential elections).
119. See generally Geis, supra note 14 (suggesting that DLT may solve problems
stemming from securities clearing mechanisms); David Yermack, Corporate Governance
and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7 (2017) (positing that blockchain is a promising new
technology that will ultimately have a transformative impact); Laster CII Speech, supra note
14 (proposing blockchain technology as an immediate solution to today’s proxy voting
problems); Michael Mainelli & Allstair Milne, The Impact and Potential of Blockchain on
the Securities Transaction Lifecycle (SWIFT Institute Working Paper No. 2015-007, 2016)
(finding that blockchain can provide substantial reductions in cost and risk).
120. Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking and Fin., 115th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2018) (Statement of Jay Clayton,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n).
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shareholder meetings, Delaware amended its corporate code to allow
corporations to hold virtual shareholder meetings.121 While investors are
not in agreement on their favorability of virtual shareholder meetings,122 the
shift toward their usage is becoming abundantly clear.123 Broadridge—
whose prominence in the proxy advisory industry is noted throughout this
Article—has many resources for companies wishing to hold meetings
online, leading one to believe that the process is relatively easy to
facilitate.124

121. See Act of June 23, 2000, ch. 343, §7, 72 Del. Laws 619, 619-20 (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(a)) (providing that the board of directors may hold shareholder
meetings “by means of remote communication”); Noel D. Humphreys, Legal Tech: When
Next We Meet Online . . ., 19 PA. LAW. 50, 51 (1997) (suggesting the idea of virtual
shareholder meetings). See generally James L. Holzman & Thomas A. Mullen, A New
Technology Frontier for Delaware Corporations, 4 DEL. L. REV. 55 (2001) (analyzing the
impact of the new statute).
122. Compare Press Release, N.Y. City Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer: Virtual Only
Meetings Deprive Shareowners of Important Rights, Stifle Criticism (Apr. 2, 2017),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/comptroller-stringer-virtual-only-meetings-deprive-s
hareowners-of-important-rights-stifle-criticism/ [https://perma.cc/Z4FN-7UG8] (highlighting the New York City Comptroller’s opposition to virtual meetings), and CALPERS,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PRINCIPALS 63 (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/for
ms-publications/global-principles-corporate-governance.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB3U-FC4C]
(indicating CalPERS’ policy that virtual shareholder meetings should only take place as a
supplement to in-person meetings), with Anders Melin, John Malone’s Formula for
Successful Shareholder Meetings: 15 Minutes or Less, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2017, 9:49
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-23/billionaire-malone-packs-fourshareholder-meetings-in-one-hour [https://perma.cc/XYA5-A9DR] (showing that one
investor was able to attend far more meetings since they were held virtually), and Cydney
Posner, Will the Virtual-Only Shareholders’ Annual Meeting, Once Disparaged, Be
Rejuvenated?, COOLEY PUBCO (June 7, 2016), https://cooleypubco.com/2016/06/07/once-dis
paraged-will-the-virtual-only-shareholders-annual-meeting-be-rejuvenated/ [https://perma.c
c/MV4C-AES7] (noting that virtual meetings are being embraced and promoted more
recently).
123. See Lisa Fontenot & Linda Dang, The Pros and Cons of Virtual-Only Shareholder
Meetings, LAW360 (Nov. 29, 2016, 12:56 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/866760/
the-pros-and-cons-of-virtual-only-shareholder-meetings [perma.cc/7XD5-6AQ6] (observing
that virtual meetings have “particular popularity with new public companies and technology
companies”). Intel, a large technology company, has recently implemented virtual
shareholder meetings. Compare Intel Corp., Proxy Statement—Notice of 2016 Annual
Stockholders’ Meeting 3 (May 19, 2016), https://s21.q4cdn.com/600692695/files/doc_finan
cials/2015/annual/Final_2016_Proxy_Statement_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLS3-W5DX]
(indicating an in-person shareholder meeting) with Intel Corp., Proxy Statement—Notice of
2017 Annual Virtual Stockholders’ Meeting 3 (May 18, 2017), https://s21.q4cdn.com/60069
2695/files/doc_financials/2017/2017-Proxy-Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCF8-QDAN]
(announcing efficiencies associated with holding a virtual shareholder meeting).
124. E.g., Virtual Shareholder Meetings, BROADRIDGE, https://www.broadridge.com/_as
sets/pdf/broadridge-vsm-brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VPC-W52J]
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Interestingly, some entities are completely removing elements of
corporate governance that have been staples for centuries. Imagine a
corporation where the power is solely vested in shareholders rather than
one where the board serves as a fiduciary intermediary. The Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (“the DAO”), an entity run on the Ethereum
blockchain,125 provided investors with the algorithmic certainty of smart
contracts instead of utilizing a sometimes-fallible board.126 As soon as
tokenholders voted on a proposal, the DAO dispersed funds precisely how
the vote specified.127 Tokenholders of the DAO could even vote on
governance rules and procedures, much like shareholders in a traditional
corporation vote to amend the charter or bylaws.128 Consequently, DLT
offers a mechanism of “radical transparency” that puts governance on
display in an indisputable ledger.129
125. Ethereum, similar to the more popular Bitcoin, is a cryptocurrency that supports
open-source, public, blockchain-based distributed computing and operating systems. More
simply, Ethereum is a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts, allowing platforms
to run exactly as programmed without any threat of interference, downtime, or third-party
interference. ETHEREUM: BLOCKCHAIN APP PLATFORM, https://www.ethereum.org/ [https://p
erma.cc/9Y47-G92B]. For an easily digestible overview of Bitcoin, see A Gentle
Introduction to Bitcoin, BITSONBLOCKS.NET (Sept. 1, 2015), https://bitsonblocks.net/2015/09
/01/gentle-introduction-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/WM5T-SBJS].
126. While outside the scope of this Article, smart contracts have the potential to greatly
impact the securities markets, particularly in structured products such as derivatives and
swaps. For an overview of how smart contracts work, see generally Nick Szabo, Smart
Contracts (1994), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/L
iterature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html [https://perma.cc/H
Y3S-68GS]. For more on smart contracts’ role within current contract law, see Max Raskin,
The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305 (2017). After reading
these pieces, one may no doubt notice how transformative smart contracts may appear, and
although rather exciting at first glance, some commentators have noted pitfalls in their
structure. See Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 291-302 (2017) (arguing that smart contracts favor one-off
transactions and are unmodifiable once executed, leading to inflexible negotiations).
127. See Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed
Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017) (examining how structure affects
the efficiency of distributed entities). Not all was hunky-dory in DAO land however, as the
entity was later subject to a hack that allowed a single operator to alter voting patterns and
move the entirety of the DAO’s assets—Ethereum coins—out of the entity thereby
rendering it valueless. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGB2-WG5X].
128. See Seth Bannon, The Tao of “The DAO”: Or How the Autonomous Corporation Is
Already Here, TECHCRUNCH (May 16, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/16/the-tao-ofthe-dao-or-how-the-autonomous-corporation-is-already-here/ [https://perma.cc/2AEE-BYW
C] (describing the voting powers of DAO tokenholders).
129. See Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Democracy: Government Of The People, By The
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B. What is Blockchain?
This section describes the technological underpinnings of blockchain
and attempts to minimize the use of programming jargon as much as
possible. Taking a page out of Frank Easterbrook’s style guide, the goal of
this section is to provide the reader with a general understanding of the
technology rather than to provide a thorough treatise on innovative
technology that may change within a few short years.130 To remain
technologically correct, DLT is literally a protocol that is made up of
blockchains. Think of the blockchain as an operational database that
maintains a distributed ledger that can be inspected openly. The terms
blockchain and distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) will be used
interchangeably for ease of understanding.
The most basic way to explain blockchain is as a method of validating
transactions without the use of a third-party entity.131 Most blockchains are
run on a peer-to-peer basis, with no central computing server operating the
network. Instead, the software functions via the connections remote
computers make with one another, making them decentralized.132 It may be
helpful to compare a decentralized blockchain network with a starfish:
[T]he starfish doesn’t have a head. Its central body isn’t even in
charge. In fact, the major organs are replicated throughout each
and every arm. If you cut the starfish in half, you’ll be in for a
surprise: the animal won’t die, and pretty soon you’ll have two

People, For The People, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/al
extapscott/2016/08/16/blockchain-democracy-government-of-the-people-by-the-people-forthe-people/#39e35d6e1fb5 [https://perma.cc/BBT9-RBQT] (providing a framework for
distributed governance).
130. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 208 (“Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about
commercial endeavors could one really understand the law about horses.”).
131. See WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY § 1 (2016) (providing a foundational
explanation of blockchain). For an extremely high-level overview of blockchain
technology, see Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to
Distributed Ledgers, IBM DEVELOPER (May 9, 2016), http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/
cloud/library/cl-blockchain-basics-intro-bluemix-trs/index.html [https://perma.cc/R5D2-BL
SF]. For a somewhat more in depth analysis, see PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE
TRUTH MACHINE: THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE FUTURE OF EVERYTHING 12-15 (2018).
132. See Detlef Schoder, Kai Fischbach & Christian Schmitt, Core Concepts in Peer-toPeer Networking, in PEER TO PEER COMPUTING: THE EVOLUTION OF A DISRUPTIVE
TECHNOLOGY 1-27 (Ramesh Subramanian & Brian D. Goodman eds., 2005) (giving an
overview and description of the application of peer-to-peer networking).
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starfish to deal with.133
This decentralized framework uses a network of “nodes” that verify
transactions and provide a “trustless consensus” to prevent fraudulent
activity.134 Nodes are simply computers that participate in recording and
verifying transactions on the DLT network. These nodes are what really
powers blockchains, but the network they create differs from a server;
unlike the World Wide Web where a site request is sent to a server, the
network of computers makes a request to the blockchain.135 The nodes
work in concert to record transactions permanently “in a way that cannot be
later erased but can only be sequentially updated, in essence keeping a
never-ending historical trail.”136
Each block contains a record of all previous transactions to ensure
total accuracy. 137 Thus, the blocks are chained together.138 Once a block is
completed and chained to the protocol sequence, someone attempting to
change a prior transaction must alter not only the initial block the
transaction was recorded on, but also all ensuing blocks that follow.
To ensure that the permanent ledger coded on the blockchain is
accurate, DLT uses hashes as a “unique fingerprint” that helps to verify that
a certain piece of information has not been altered. Simply put, a hash
function is a mathematical process that takes data of any size, performs
operations on them, and returns output data of a fixed size. For example,
Bitcoin’s hash keys use a sixty-four character string of letters and numbers
into which text as complex as the entirety of Dickens’s A Tale of Two
Cities could be encoded.139 The hashes are used to create cryptographic
133. ORI BRAFMAN & ROD BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER 35 (2006).
134. See Marvin, supra note 112 (describing blockchain-based systems used to prevent
fraud).
135. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the ZeroMember LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1488-89 (2014) (noting that there is no “Bitcoin
server or Bitcoin company that directly manages the system”); see also Joshua Fairfield,
Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
35, 36 (2014) (describing the use of blockchain for smart contracts where digital assets are
transferred within the blockchain).
136. HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM 94 (2016) (“It’s not a blockchain if its copies are
not stored, identically, across massively many computers. . . . Fundamentally the data a
blockchain holds is a sequence of transactions. And as of today it is essential that no
transaction is ever forgotten.”).
137. Id. at 33.
138. See MOUGAYAR, supra note 131 (describing the mechanisms and algorithms behind
blockchains).
139. Corin Faife, Bitcoin Hash Functions Explained, COINDESK (Feb. 19, 2017, 12:35
PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-hash-functions-explained/ [https://perma.cc/YK2YCMRM]; Hashing Technology in Blockchain, BLOCKCHAIN EXPERT (Oct. 25, 2017),
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keys, one public and one private. The public key serves as a method of
recording ownership, and the private key ensures that only the owner of the
asset recorded on the blockchain can access their property.140 One may
analogize a public key to an email address, and the private key may be
thought of as the password allowing the sender to originate messages from
the account. Since anyone with access to the blockchain can reasonably
conclude that someone with the corresponding private key conducted a
transaction posted by a public key, there is no need for a trusted third
party.141
In order to ensure that information sent to the blockchain by nodes is
accurate and can be trusted, DLT utilizes a concept called consensus. The
premise is that “all nodes control each other all the time” and they know
“exactly what every other node should hold as truth.”142 “If all nodes agree,
this is called consensus.”143
Different blockchain platforms have
incorporated differing methods of establishing consensus and the most
prominent method of consensus is called proof-of-work, which is utilized
by Bitcoin and has become preeminent in the cryptographic community.
The process allows participants to add new financial records to the
authoritative sequence by demonstrating that they have expended
computing power on an otherwise unimportant, repetitive task. This
process, known as Bitcoin mining, confers the right to add a record to the
sequence (and also, not incidentally, it is rewarded by the creation of new
Bitcoins, partly as an incentive to participate in the network and partly as a
http://www.blockchainexpert.uk/blog/hashing-technology-in-blockchain
[https://perma.cc/H6F2-S5PB]. Hash functions are an essential component of cryptography
that is rather complex in nature and difficult to understand. See Isaac Simpson, To
Understand Blockchains, You Should Understand Cryptographic Hashes First, MEDIUM
(Sept. 19, 2017), https://medium.com/vandal-press/to-understand-blockchains-you-shouldunderstand-cryptographic-hashes-first-for-normies-93bc7645e816 [https://perma.cc/2YTSYTGW] (“[C]ryptographic hash functions are . . . magic and you will never fully understand
them unless you are a mathematician.”).
140. ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 18(2014); Melanie Swan, BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW
ECONOMY 3 (2015); Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of
Distributed Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 200
(2016).
141. See ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 140, at 173-74; Michael Abramowicz,
Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 372 (2016).
142. DIEDRICH, supra note 136, at 20 (emphasis in original).
143. Id.; see MOUGAYAR, supra note 131 (“A consensus algorithm is the nucleus of a
blockchain representing the method or protocol that commits the transaction. It is important,
because we need to trust those transactions.”). For more on consensus and how it works,
see ALJOSHA JUDMAYER ET AL., BLOCKS AND CHAINS: INTRODUCTION TO BITCOIN,
CRYPTOCURRENCIES, AND THEIR CONSENSUS MECHANISMS 29-43 (2017).
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way to manage the initial distribution of Bitcoins). In the event of a dispute
among different candidate sequences of transactions, the one that is
eventually backed by the most computing power wins.144 Although these
algorithms have fundamental differences, for our purposes these
mechanisms can be viewed as taking a different route to the same result.
C. Shareholder Voting and the Blockchain
With an understanding of DLT in mind, it’s easy to see how the basic
problems of corporate voting in the United States—lack of transparency,
verification of votes, and identification of correct voters—can be remedied
using DLT. Shareholder votes could be recorded on one of two types of
distributed ledgers that could be managed directly by the corporation or by
shareholders themselves.145 These two variations are commonly known in
their application as permissioned and unpermissioned ledgers, respectively.
In the permissioned variant, a company may set up a blockchain requiring
“permission” to read the blockchain’s information, limit the parties that can
contract on the chain, and limit those that can serve as nodes maintaining
the chain’s security.146 In contrast, an unpermissioned ledger allows
anyone to read the chain, make legitimate changes, and operate the network
by serving as a node.147
For example, Bitcoin operates as an
unpermissioned blockchain and is totally decentralized, thereby allowing
anyone to transact on the chain or contribute to the network. As such,
companies are most likely to use permissioned ledgers to allow only
management, shareholders of record, or a proxy advisory firm to operate
the ledger. Regulators would likely receive permissions to view the
blockchain’s data to review votes for compliance with the law.
But how would the actual process for blockchain voting on a
permissioned ledger work? Companies would continue to set record dates
and intermediaries would be required to upload a list of beneficial owners

144. Bayern, supra note 135, at 1490-91. See Antonopoulos, supra note 140, at xxi
(defining a miner as a “network node that finds valid proof-of-work for new blocks); see
also PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND
ECONOMICS 103 (2015) (“To secure the blockchain . . . Bitcoin requires proof-of-work to be
performed on blocks of transactions following the Solution-Verification protocol.”).
145. Cristoph F. Van der Elst & Anne J.F. Lafarre, Blockchain and the 21st Century
Annual General Meeting, 14 EUR. CO. L. 167, 168 (2017).
146. Nolan Bauerle, What is the Difference Between Public and Permissioned
Blockchains?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-the-difference-bet
ween-open-and-permissioned-blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/N2NL-HFVL].
147. Id.
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prior to that date.148 These beneficial owners would be provided a certain
amount of tokenized voting rights, which for our purposes we will call
“votecoins.”149 These coins would be deposited in shareholders’ public
addresses to which only they, or their designated proxy, would have access
to the associated private keys. Shareholders send their “votecoins” to
public addresses corresponding with their voting preference using a
consensus method in accordance with blockchain’s transaction protocol.
This method will likely be proof-of-concept. The more popular proof-ofwork protocol may enable shareholders to create new votecoins and
therefore more votes, an obviously undesirable result.
Before the voting process begins, shareholders could continue the
process of designating a proxy to vote in their stead. This would be
achieved in one of two ways: either by transferring votecoins via the
blockchain to the proxy’s public address or by providing the private key to
the proxy holder. The preferable method is to provide the private key to
the voter’s proxy, allowing the voter to determine exactly how their shares
were voted. If a voter simply transfers her votecoins to the proxy’s public
address, the concept of shares held in fungible bulk becomes replicated in a
tokenized manner.
Each shareholder, and their proxies, can verify precisely how their
votes were cast and included in the vote counts recorded on the
blockchain.150 Shareholders are thus able to independently verify the
voting results and regulators will be satisfied that no foul play has
interfered with the voting process. Both shareholders and management will
have access to vote tabulation in real time, providing both parties an equal
chance to intervene with last minute campaigning.151
There are clear benefits to implementing this process. Chiefly, there
is the capability of using electronic proxies, which many scholars have
noted as a solution for reducing the costs associated with shareholder
voting.152 Additionally, the inability to confirm voting information is
148. Adoption of DLT technology for securities clearing could render this step
unnecessary, as beneficial owners may soon be directly listed on company’s stock registers.
149. See Yermack, supra note 119, at 23 (coining the term “votecoin,” pun intended).
150. See Anne Lafarre & Cristoph Van der Elst, Blockchain Technology for Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Activism, EUR. CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., Working Paper No.
390/2018 at 17 (March 2018) (providing an overview of how blockchains may be used by
shareholder activists to enhance monitoring at reduced cost).
151. Yermack, supra note 119, at 23.
152. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Proxy Contests in an Era of Increasing Shareholder Power:
Forget Issuer Proxy Access and Focus on E-Proxy, 61 VAND. L. REV. 475, 476 (2008)
(noting decreased agency costs when e-proxies are used); George Ponds Kobler,
Shareholder Voting over the Internet: A Proposal for Increasing Shareholder Participation
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directly linked to the fact that no one individual participant in the process
possesses all the information necessary to discern whether a particular
shareholder’s vote has been accurately recorded.153 DLT directly addresses
these core issues. Custodians and a central accountant such as DTC
become unnecessary in a system where there is only one owner recorded on
the blockchain: the beneficial owner. The levels of each share’s ownership
would be recorded on a single ledger, demanding no need to reconcile
systems or agree to various obligations.154 As a result, the centralized
ledger—assuming the use of a permissioned blockchain—reduces brokers’
or proxy solicitors’ tasks in distributing voting materials and instructions,
thereby decreasing voting costs incurred by companies on behalf of
shareholders.
Overall, the greater speed, transparency, and accuracy of blockchain
voting could motivate shareholders to participate more directly in
governance and demand votes on more topics with greater frequency.155
Companies and their shareholders will gain confidence in the accuracy of
voting, resulting in less litigation that occurs when votes are mistakenly
cast.156 The problem of empty voting is mediated since voting power
remains attached to individual shares for longer periods, preventing sellers
from voting shares they have no longer owned for months. Thus, there will
be fewer situations where extraneous votes are available for sale or
manipulation.157 Stock loans would become immediately transparent,
providing notice to shareholders, management, and regulators of a
redistribution of voting power.158
The benefits of using DLT for voting are not only clearly
in Corporate Governance, 49 ALA. L. REV. 673, 694 (1998) (stating that the Internet and
proxy system make for a “natural marriage” to reduce costs associated with governance
participation by way of video teleconferencing or voting via a corporate homepage).
153. See SEC Concept release, supra note 12, at *39 (highlighting that neither issuers,
transfer agents, vote tabulators, securities intermediaries, nor third party proxy service
providers possess all information related to voting).
154. OLIVER WYMAN, supra note 103; Laster CII Speech, supra note 14.
155. See Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain Technology
and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia (Working Paper, Yeshiva University & Université Paris
II, 2015) (remarking that the use of blockchains may result in large entities losing the ability
to control and shape existing democratic processes); see also infra Part III.B (discussing
pros and cons of relying on the shareholder franchise).
156. E.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 2010 WL 707425, C.A. No. 5019-VCL (Del. Ch. Feb. 9,
2010) (detailing voting errors by a record owner in a proxy contest); see also supra notes
79-92 and accompanying text.
157. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129, 162-66 (2009) (suspecting that short sales of stock are often simple vote buying
transactions).
158. See Yermack, supra note 119, at 24.
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ascertainable, but they are also readily capable of implementation. The
blockchain initiative in Delaware is well underway, and former Delaware
Governor Jack Markell has stated that blockchain will remedy large
corporate expenditures aimed at fixing stock issuance and voting errors that
could be “seamlessly” handled from the outset.159 Although this initiative
is currently only aimed at improving private company records, it will not be
long before state and federal regulatory agencies shift their focus to
blockchain as well. Adoption is coming. Nevertheless, shareholders need
to remain mindful of many shortfalls and potential problems that
blockchain use for shareholder voting may cause. The next section
discusses these pitfalls extensively.
III. WHY BOTHER?
Once one understands DLT and blockchain technology, the benefits
are pretty easy to spot. Votes could be processed quickly, accurately, and
securely. Shareholders and the marketplace could develop greater trust in
the system and spend far less capital on expensive recounts and proxy
solicitation services. In the aforementioned P&G proxy contest debacle,160
Trian spent $25 million and P&G spent a whopping $100 million
attempting to hold a single board seat—not even to gain control of the
board and, therefore, control of the company’s decision making process.161
Corporations, or more accurately, their boards, tend to spend lavishly when
defending board seats from a hostile or activist investor. These expenses
appear to be pointless, however, because shareholders are no more likely to
exercise their franchise when management spends more.162 But the benefits
of blockchain could possibly be achieved without using a technology that
159. Giulio Prisco, Delaware Blockchain Initiative to Streamline Record-Keeping for
Private Companies, BITCOIN MAG. (May 9, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/dela
ware-blockchain-initiative-to-streamline-record-keeping-for-private-companies-1462812187
[https://perma.cc/43ED-3DJV] (quoting Governor Markell as saying “companies allocate
significant financial resources to correct and validate stock authorization and issuance errors
that could have been correctly and seamlessly handled from the outset . . . Distributed ledger
shares hold the promise of . . . dramatic increases in efficiency and speed.”).
160. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
161. Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter & Gamble Declares Victory in Expensive
Proxy Fight, CNN (Oct. 10, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/10/news/companies/proct
er-gamble-proxy-fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/YQ4W-M5JT].
162. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, Corporate Voting and the Proxy Process:
Managerial Control Versus Shareholder Oversight (paper presented at Tuck-JFE
Contemporary Corp. Governance Conference, 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=236099 [https://perma.cc/4KLP-XH9Z] (finding no relationship between the
amount of money spent on proxy solicitors and voter turnout).
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most still do not know much about. Instead of buying into the blockchain
hysteria, shareholders, corporations, and regulators can use more
established technologies to reach the same ends.
Apart from the biased focus on disruptive technologies, supporters of
blockchain technology seem to overlook the threshold question of whether
the shareholder franchise should be given a more significant role in
corporate governance. Economic and financial theory indicates that
shareholders do not have proper incentives to care about their votes, and
that their votes often will not matter anyway given the reality of current
corporate boards, the structure of corporate control transactions, and other
methods of undermining the shareholder franchise.
A. Blockchain’s Mythical Benefits
1. Blockchain Voting Needs a Speeding Ticket
One of the principal benefits of using blockchains for shareholder
voting is the speed at which votes could be held and accurately recorded.
Yet, speed of a proxy contest is not always a net positive.
The power of the vote itself provides a large economic incentive to
investors that can be attributed to one part of the underlying stock price.
Peter Dodd and Jerome Warner find positive returns up to the record date
before a proxy contest but significantly negative returns between a proxy
contest announcement and the outcome itself.163 They proffer the “value of
the vote hypothesis” that attributes the increasing stock price during the
period leading up to the record date to the value of each share’s vote.164
This hypothesis suggests that the price of the stock should decrease after
the record date because only the record holder has the right to vote in the
proxy contest.165 These findings seemingly suggest that the increased
processing speed offered by blockchain voting would be a positive
innovation. But these findings, although significant, are hardly conclusive,
and many studies have actually indicated that shortened proxy contests
have the opposite result. One such study found an average positive return
to stock price of 11.4% during a proxy contest166 while another, similar
163. Peter Dodd & Jerome B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy
Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 424 (1983).
164. Id. at 425-31.
165. Id. at 428-29; see also Chinmoy Ghosh et al., Proxy Contests: A Re-examination of
the Value of the Vote Hypothesis, 18 MANAGERIAL FIN. 3, 10 (1992) (uncovering significant
negative returns following the record date of a proxy contest).
166. Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy
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study found that even after normalization for other factors, abnormal
shareholder wealth creation rested positively around six percent.167 To be
fair, there are a multitude of studies that suggest that proxy contests
increase shareholder value overall. I agree and do not contend that proxy
contests are bad for shareholders, but drastically increasing their speed may
negate these effects.168
Apart from wealth returns to shareholders, speedy contests may not
prove beneficial for dissenters who are most often the shareholders most
likely to exercise their franchise. In a 1988 study, John Pound found that
shortening the amount of time between announcement of a proxy contest
and its outcome indicated a lower chance of dissident success.169
Seemingly, management may use quicker proxy votes to sway contests in
their favor. Yair Listokin of Yale Law School has researched this
phenomenon extensively and has commented that proposals and candidates
sponsored by management are “overwhelmingly more likely to win . . . by
a very small amount than to lose by a very small amount—to a degree that
cannot occur by chance.”170 Although blockchain provides more accuracy
in vote tabulation and transparency of those results,171 management can use
the more rapid time frame to manipulate those results. As noted above, the
most likely form of DLT that would be used for shareholder voting itself is
the private, permissioned ledger, negating the benefits that could be derived
if the greater marketplace sees the outcome of votes.172 Undoubtedly, the
SEC would serve as regulator over these mechanics since it already
requires ‘34 Act reporting companies to submit 8-K’s following every vote
Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance,
21 FIN. MGMT. 22, 28 (1992).
167. Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of
Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 40 (1989). But see Thomas & Tricker,
supra note 85, at 84 (removing the forty-day period used by the DeAngelos leads to a 12.47% return, supporting the notion that the market already prices in the contest and
therefore the length of the contest does not matter).
168. DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 167 Lakonishok, Corporate Governance
Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 432–33 (1993); J.
Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change:
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 280 (1998).
169. John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 237, 258-59 (1988).
170. Listokin, supra note 3 at 161; see also Thomas & Tricker, supra note 85, at 84-85
(noting a similar phenomenon with management proposals and stating “management is
aware that the length of time [of the vote] influences the number of votes cast, so
management uses this phenomenon to their advantage to secure passage of their
proposals.”).
171. See infra Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
172. See supra Part II.C.
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of security holders.173 But the SEC has traditionally been behind the
blockchain curve and likely will not be able to properly regulate these votes
any time in the near future.
Shareholders receive a proxy statement with important information
prior to every shareholder vote to enable them to become more informed
voters and thereby exercise their franchise intelligently.174 Speeding up the
proxy voting mechanism may shorten an already intense proxy season,
which features thousands of meetings over the course of a brief period. A
basic Schedule 14A proxy statement is frequently more than seventy-five
pages175 and in a year with a contested board election, the filings and their
subsequent amendments may be much longer.176 Glass Lewis, a prominent
proxy advisory firm, handles the influx of work during this season by
hiring temporary workers. Needless to say, the average shareholder can do
no such thing. Will shareholders who already have full-time jobs
elsewhere dedicate their precious time toward reading the entirety of these
filings?177 No doubt a rhetorical question. Currently, proxy statements are
mailed—or delivered electronically178—and shareholders have at least
twenty days to review the information and cast their votes.179 The
integration of blockchain will surely necessitate new rules to adjust to the
shifting technology and general trend toward informing the market more
and more rapidly. Given that shareholders, especially retail holders, are
likely not reading their mailings, a quicker turnaround time will result in a
much less informed voting shareholder.
Acknowledging the shifting paradigm toward holdings by institutions
rather than retail investors,180 these institutional investors already face
173. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC 873, FORM 8-K, § 5.07 (2012) (noting that an 8-K
should be filed for any matter submitted to a vote of securities holders and requiring specific
information based on the type of vote).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2014).
175. E.g., Alphabet Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 28, 2017).
176. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Aug. 1, 2017)
(containing a twenty-two page appendix in addition to a seventy-two page proxy statement).
Note that a search on the SEC’s EDGAR platform reveals that P&G made over eighty
subsequent amendments to its initial definitive filing.
177. See infra Part III.B for a discussion on rational ignorance, a theory that states that
the average shareholder is rationally ignorant to the goings on at a company because their
single vote will not alter the outcome of an election; ANDREAS CAHN & DAVID C. DONALD,
COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW 474 (2010) (opining facetiously that shareholders will “sit
down after work some evening and read a 150-page proxy statement.”).
178. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2014) (noting that proxies may be delivered
electronically or made available online).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(10) (2014) (stating that twenty days is the minimum).
180. See Steven David Solomonoff, Rise of Institutional Investors Raises Questions of
Collusion, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/business/deal
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enormous pressure to cut costs and cannot add staff comparably as their
proxy advisory counterparts can.181 There also exists a dichotomy between
those who make investment decisions at institutions and those who cast the
votes on behalf of the institution as the owner.182 This divorce results
because all too often investors such as pension funds, hedge funds, and
university endowments use the recommendations of proxy advisors to
make their own voting decisions. In fact, a single proxy advisor,
Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), impacts the “governance
decisions of professional investors controlling . . . half the value of the
world’s common stock.”183 One cannot blame the institutions for using
these specialized companies given that, in 2012 alone, a single institutional
investor received more than 129,000 management and shareholder
proposals.184 In theory, proxy advisors provide a specialized service for
institutional investors in a broad space. The investors should be analyzing
market trends, assessing management’s ideas, and understanding economic
fundamentals, not wasting their time on trivial corporate governance
issues.185 But whereas these investors owe fiduciary duties to their clients,
book/rise-of-institutional-investors-raisesquestions-of-collusion.html [https://perma.cc/73W
H-M6HN] (noting that Blackrock, Vanguard, and other institutions own roughly seventy
percent of the public stock market); ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 465 (2010) (stating that the top one hundred institutional
investors own fifty-two percent of publicly-held stock and that “the persons acting on behalf
of the majority of shareholders of corporate America could all fit into a large law school
classroom.”); see also Robert Profusek, The Increasing Power of Institutional Investors,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/06/24/the-increa
sing-power-of-institutional-investors/ [https://perma.cc/JZG7-8J6S] (stressing the role of
institutional investors in corporate governance).
181. See, e.g., Madison Marriage & Attracta Mooney, Hedge Funds and Private Equity
Pressured to Cut Fees, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/07867a66-d7
37-11e5-8887-98e7feb46f27 [https://perma.cc/G9UZ-CL4B] (stating that nearly two-thirds
of pension funds in the United States are under pressure to cut investment costs). See
generally STEPHEN DAVIS, JON LUKOMNIK & DAVID PITT-WATSON, THE NEW CAPITALISTS
(2006) (highlighting the pressure on institutional investors by individuals whom have
invested their life savings into pooled investment schemes).
182. See Charles M. Nathan, The Parallel Universes of Institutional Investing and
Institutional Owning, HARV. L. SCHOOL F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (April 6, 2010), https://co
rpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and-insti
tutional-voting/ [https://perma.cc/6Y4S-BQMW] (stressing that the divorce between
institutional investing and institutional voting results from too many portfolio companies
and various rules by regulators).
183. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry With a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2006, at S3.
184. Carol J. Loomis, BlackRock: The $4.3 trillion force, FORTUNE (July 7, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/blackrock-larry-fink/ [https://perma.cc/AL7R-BYLC].
185. For a thoughtful piece defending proxy advisors and the work they perform, see
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proxy advisors owe no fiduciary duties to their clients or the shareholders
of the companies whose proposals and management slates they are
evaluating.186
Speeding the timeline of shareholder voting will only increase
institutional investors’ reliance on these advisors and, largely unchecked,
proxy advisors have gained tremendous power over the shareholder vote
under a regulatory regime that encourages shareholders to rely on their
recommendations.187 Today, proxy advisors wield tremendous power over
the outcome of a vote. The Wall Street Journal has gone as far as saying
that a “black mark from ISS could be very harmful to a company.”188
Current Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine notes that CEOs frequently
travel to ISS’s headquarters to persuade it of their views, recognizing that
some investors will “simply follow ISS’s advice rather than do any
thinking of their own.”189 If a busy CEO comes begging ISS for services
rather than the other way around, the industry’s prominence speaks for
itself. We should hesitate before placing more power in proxy advisors that
enjoy nearly unchecked monopoly power, increases agency costs, and have
great sway on the shareholder vote.190
This is not to say there are no benefits to shortening the time it takes
George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287.
186. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards A True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist
Response to Bebchuk’s Solution For Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV.
1759, 1765 (2006) (“Unlike corporate managers, neither institutional investors as
stockholders nor ISS as voting advisor owe fiduciary duties to the corporations whose
policies they seek to influence.”).
187. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth
or Reality, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 872-79 (2010) (summarizing how proxy advisors have
become increasingly important as a result of SEC and NYSE rules); Paul Rose, The
Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 887 (2007) (“The corporate governance
industry influences (and in some cases effectively controls) the votes of trillions of dollars
of equity . . . the governance policies and fortunes of countless companies through proxy
voting recommendations and governance ratings.”).
188. Monica Langley, ISS Rates Firms – and Sells Roadmap to Boosting Score, WALL
ST. J. (June 6, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105485006531971100 [https://perma.
cc/35PZ-LRGV].
189. Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry:
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 384, 429 (2009)
(citing Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005)).
190. See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 187, at 906 (finding that ISS’s
recommendation sways a shareholder vote by at least six to ten percent); see also Strine,
supra note 186, at 1765 (“The influence of ISS and its competitors over institutional
investor voting behavior is so considerable that . . . any initiative to increase stockholder
power will simply shift more clout to firms of this kind—firms even more unaccountable
than their institutional investor clients.”).
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to collect and count the votes.191 Management may be able to implement
changes quicker and close transactions more rapidly thereby providing
certainty and reducing transaction based arbitrage. After all, one of the
hallmarks of Delaware corporate law is the certainty afforded by its large
body of precedent and dedicated Chancery Court, which lowers transaction
costs for companies incorporated or litigating there.192 But the inconclusive
impact on shareholder wealth, dearth of necessary information, and reliance
on proxy advisors sway the needle against shortening the timeline between
proxy solicitations and voting.
2. Accuracy Attributes Can Be Replicated
In Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., the Delaware Chancery Court stated
“those in charge of the election machinery of a corporation must be held to
the highest standards in providing for and conducting corporate
elections.”193 Blockchain appears to be a simple solution for boards and
managers to meet these high standards. It offers near-instantaneous
confirmation of votes, and voters can confirm their votes were counted
properly using the unique hash algorithm of the associated blockchain.194
The permanent record established by the ledger may help prevent problems
such as the T. Rowe Price debacle whereby shares were voted
incorrectly.195 One prominent drawback is that blockchain transactions
cannot be changed post hoc—the ledger is immutable. Simple errors like
entering a voting address one digit off may result in votes being lost or
incorrectly attributed to the wrong selection.
More intriguing, however, is that the benefits derived from the
accuracy of blockchain can easily be realized with already-established
technologies as simple as websites. There is no need to build a blockchain
for everything, as many who support the technology lead others to

191. See Borstadt & Zwirlein, supra note 166 (discussing positive shareholder wealth
implications).
192. See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (using the doctrine
of independent legal significance in interpreting the Delaware corporate code to create
certainty and prevent litigation); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 216 (lower
transaction costs justify increased cost of incorporating in Delaware); see also Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (articulating the position that Delaware state law represents a “race
to the top” and that other jurisdictions should emulate its corporate regime).
193. 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987).
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. Levine, supra note 11.
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believe.196 Even if a problem can be solved using DLT, it may not be the
most efficient solution. A common perception in the world of virtual
currencies is that many currencies themselves have no underlying value
apart from what people believe they are worth. Aptly named the
“Tinkerbell effect,” it can be stated that the current mania surrounding DLT
processes is wholly similar.197 Once the general populace realizes that,
although revolutionary, DLT may not be the answer for everything, the
shift of resources into a blockchain method for shareholder voting may be
rendered moot. However, the tide of investment has not stopped in 2018
and venture capital investment in the blockchain sphere has dramatically
increased in recent years.198
Numerous web-based voting applications already exist, including
basic websites such as Google’s Forms application, Survey Monkey, and
Doodle.199 These platforms display the ease in creating simple polls and
conducting elections in an extremely cost effective manner. Obviously,
shareholder voting is not a simple endeavor and requires a user interface
and servers that have the capacity to enable millions (or billions) of
shareholders to cast their votes. Platforms such as ElectionRunner200 and
DirectVote201 can provide the parameters necessary to host a large
corporate election. Specifically, ElectionRunner facilitates the elections for
196. See Antonio Grumser, Buddha and the Blockchain: Everything in Moderation,
BITCOINIST (Mar. 30, 2018, 3:15 AM), http://bitcoinist.com/everything-in-moderation-evenblockchain/ [https://perma.cc/PS2C-YWXQ] (discussing how the rise of Bitcoin in late
2017 led to the mass adoption of blockchain technology as “an end instead of a means to an
end.”).
197. The notion rests on the Disney story of Peter Pan, where the fairy Tinkerbell exists
only so long as one believes in her. See PETER PAN (Walt Disney Prod. 1953) (exemplifying
the effect when Tinkerbell recovers from near death due to belief by the audience); see also,
e.g., ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 169 (2016) (“[M]y belief that the [B]itcoins I am receiving
today are of value depends on my expectation that tomorrow other people will believe the
same thing . . . consensus on value relies on believing that consensus on value will
continue.”).
198. Marie Huillet, Venture Capital Investment in Blockchain and Crypto Up 280% in
2018, Report Shows, COIN TELEGRAPH (Oct. 2, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ventu
re-capital-investment-in-blockchain-and-crypto-up-280-in-2018-report-shows [https://perma
.cc/3KC4-R9E9].
199. GOOGLE FORMS, https://www.google.com/forms/about/ [https://perma.cc/TZY9-HQ
EB]; SURVEY MONKEY, https://www.surveymonkey.com/ [https://perma.cc/A5RT-986U];
DOODLE, https://doodle.com/ [https://perma.cc/H82G-9HYV].
200. ELECTIONRUNNER, https://electionrunner.com/ [https://perma.cc/TV7D-4PQW].
201. See SBS DIRECTVOTE, https://www.surveyandballotsystems.com/services/voting-se
rvices/directvote/ [https://perma.cc/7P54-LRGT] (DirectVote is a fully operational platform
that supports any number of voters. It is sophisticated and even complies with the
Americans with Disabilities Act.).
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the University of Florida’s student government, an organization requiring
software to facilitate more than 35,000 votes. These applications are mere
examples of the simplicity involved in creating and operating a platform
that facilitates the corporate shareholder vote.
Blockchains can be expensive and difficult to create.
Most
shareholders have no idea how the current proxy mechanisms work. While
blockchain’s accuracy attributes could fundamentally change securities
clearing processes, at this juncture it seems unnecessary to use DLT to
increase the accuracy of the shareholder vote when other, cheaper
approaches can be implemented.
B. Focus on the Shareholder Franchise is Misguided
The focus of this Article is not to disparage the use of DLT throughout
the securities industry and within corporate law generally.202 Rather, the
goal is to display that use of blockchain as a solution for shareholder voting
may be shortsighted. It overvalues the shareholder franchise and furthers
misinterpretations of corporate law that permeate economic thought in the
area. Information disparities, rational ignorance, and the overall sentiment
on the value of the shareholder vote indicate that shareholders are actually
better off remaining uninformed and abstaining from corporate votes.
Although much of prevailing theory emphasizes putting shareholder
interests above all others, directors and corporate theorists are missing the
point of the corporation itself. In short, the costs of instituting DLT for
shareholder voting greatly outweigh the benefits. Finally, the decision of
whether to switch to a blockchain shareholder voting platform should be
guided by the response of the marketplace rather than by the thoughts of
experts.
1. Vaguely Valuable? Is the Vote Worth Anything?
In Delaware and other states, the majority of corporate power rests
with the board of directors.203 The powers of the board are “original and
undelegated,” stemming from a combination of the charter and state

202. In fact, as mentioned several times in this Article, DLT can and is proving to be
incredibly useful in easing the major problems underlying securities clearing in both the
United States and globally.
203. See DEL CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”).
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laws.204 These powers encompass ordinary business of the corporation
such as naming a CEO, calling a shareholder meeting,205 or declaring a
dividend, and “stockholders cannot . . . control the . . . judgment vested in
[the directors] by virtue of their office.”206 In turn, these directors owe
shareholders the fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty to ensure they act
in the best interests of the corporation.207 Shareholders retain the right to
elect directors and vote on fundamental changes such as charter
amendments and certain types of transactions.208
This power distribution model creates a disparity in knowledge
between the two levels of governance that no blockchain can remedy.
Corporate board meetings are closed to shareholders for a number of
reasons, including protecting proprietary information and limiting insider
trading or fraud on the market. These meetings are frequently kept so
secretive that “[n]o one, other than the directors, the CEO-chairman, and
the corporate secretary, knows what transpires behind the closed doors of
the corporate boardroom.”209 Recognizing this information dichotomy and
the desire to facilitate informed shareholder votes, Delaware law allows
stockholder to inspect certain corporate documents.210 However, section
220 is not all encompassing and does not open the door for shareholders to
conduct a sweeping search. This right is curtailed in that stockholders must
prove a proper purpose before the Chancery Court in order to gain access.
Such proper purposes include determining mismanagement or misconduct
204. People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 241 N.Y. 194, 200 (N.Y. 1911); see also
Charlestown Boot v. Dunmore, 60 N.H. 85 (N.H. 1880) (holding that the only limitation
upon the discretion of the board of directors is what the charter and bylaws impose). State
laws often afford great power to corporate boards. For example, in Delaware, boards can
create new classes of stock without shareholder approval and can assign various rights to
that stock. DEL CODE ANN. TIT. 8, §§ 151(a), 157(a). This provision, along with others,
enables boards to enact one of the most effective anti-takeover mechanisms, the Poison Pill.
PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 180, at 919-22.
205. See DEL CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 211 (stating that only the board has the power to call a
meeting of shareholders).
206. Manice, 241 N.Y. at 200.
207. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)
(affirming the fiduciary duties of due care and loyalty in Delaware).
208. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
209. JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE
BOARDS 55 (Elizabeth MacIver ed., 1989).
210. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (allowing shareholders to inspect a
corporation’s stock ledger, list of its stockholders, and other books and records). While
Delaware’s statute does not make a distinction as to what constitutes a book or record, the
Model Business Corporation Act separates board minutes into a category of records that
requires a shareholder to indicate a proper purpose prior to their release. MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 16.02(b)(1).
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with specific allegations, determining the value of the corporation, and
preparing for an upcoming shareholder proposal.211 Plaintiffs bear this
burden and must make “specific and discrete identification, with rifled
precision . . . [to] establish that each category of books and records is
essential to the accomplishment of their articulated purpose.”212 Putting
board knowledge of company specific information on a blockchain is not
only inefficient and a foolish use of the technology, but also will likely lead
to more frivolous claims against directors and will not aid shareholders in
articulating the proper purpose necessary to access information in the first
place. Some claim that greater access to information will increase the role
of shareholders in corporate governance.213 Yet Jill Fisch persuasively
argues that greater access to information and heightened transparency
actually results in inefficiencies and obstacles to a board’s execution of
both its strategic and managerial role within the company.214 Also, what
one person may view as an “active monitor” is “another person’s ‘intrusive
busybody’ or ‘speculator.’”215
Even where shareholders have the ability to become informed through
active monitoring or inspection of records, it is not always in their best
interest to do so. As the philosopher Edmund Burke put it, “[y]our
representative owes to you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he
betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”216
Theoretically, a perfectly informed shareholder undermines the whole
purpose of representation by a prudent board comprised of members with
experience as investment bankers, lawyers, or business executives.217 As a
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c); Saito v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 806 A.2d 113, 116
(Del. 2002); see also Security First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563,
568 (Del. 1977) (“mere curiosity or desire for a fishing expedition” does not warrant a § 220
search).
212. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 266-67 (Del. 2000) (emphasis added).
213. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 849, 854-56 (2012) (highlighting an informed shareholder’s ability to
monitor management effectively, thereby reducing agency costs).
214. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. R. 265, 272-75 (1997)
(discussing the functions of the managerial board).
215. Rock, supra note 213, at 855; see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum,
Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS.
LAW. 67, 92-93 (2003) (arguing that even with more robust information, a disparity will
always exist between a company’s board and its shareholders and prying shareholders
distract the board from its mission).
216. EDMUND BURKE, II WORKS 95-96 (1866).
217. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 8 (arguing that the structure of the
firm enables an efficient method of specialization between owners and controllers); Lynn A.
Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, in ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS
OF CORPORATE LAW 358 (2d ed. 2010) (offering the notion that “shareholders, like Ulysses,
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result of this representation by an intelligent party, the shareholder’s cost of
informing herself prior to a shareholder vote is often higher than the
benefits of such knowledge.218 It takes a considerable amount of time to
properly obtain the knowledge required to be an informed shareholder, and
many may not partake in the endeavor. Consider further that most
Americans now invest in passively managed mutual and index funds.219 In
ceding active management, these shareholders care little about the
underlying stocks owned by their respective indices and value returns over
all else. They will certainly care even less about minor corporate
governance issues at individual portfolio companies.220 Even shareholders
who actively manage their investments have notoriously been
uninformed.221 As Frank Emerson & Franklin Latcham wrote in 1954, “the
stockholder, of all people, has shown a peculiarly high degree of
indifference to what goes on in his corporation, and worse, that he would
not understand it anyway.”222 While a blockchain may make casting a
proxy vote slightly cheaper, implementation of the technology will not
sometimes see advantage in ‘tying their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation
to directors largely insulated from their own influence.”); see also United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (deeming the democratic process too important to
be left to a democratic process).
218. Supra note 176 and accompanying text; PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 180, at
461-62; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, in
ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 158 (2d ed. 2010) (“Shareholders’
approval of changes is likely to be unreliable as an indicator of their interests, because
scattered shareholders in public firms do not have the time, information, or incentive to
review all proposed changes.”).
219. See Trevor Hunnicutt, Index Funds to Surpass Active Fund Assets in U.S. by 2024:
Moody’s, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-funds-passi
ve/index-funds-to-surpass-active-fund-assets-in-u-s-by-2024-moodys-idUSKBN15H1PN [h
ttps://perma.cc/TN9J-RU96] (describing the drastic rise of passively managed index funds);
Tom Petruno, Small Investors’ Move to ‘Passive’ Stock Funds Becomes a Stampede, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 9, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-investing-quarterlyindex-funds-20170409-story.html [https://perma.cc/LC8H-2AT4] (noting that passively
managed funds saw an increase in investment by forty-two percent in 2016 while outflows
from actively managed funds decreased by more than $500 billion during the same period).
220. A relatively new phenomenon related to indices that may potentially help the
passive investor make more informed decisions is that of corporate governance indices.
These metrics driven models seek to compare various firms with respect to their governance
practices including antitakeover devices, capital structure, presence of dual class stock, etc.
See generally Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2008).
221. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 710 (1995) (“We live in a world of
ignorance and uncertainty . . . [i]n the case of stock markets, any analysis that ignores
ignorance risks being incomplete indeed.”).
222. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 15, at 10.
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reduce information gathering costs to the point where it makes sense for
shareholders to inform themselves—the problem of rational ignorance is
here to stay.
To shareholders, the value of their vote lacks much power to begin
with.223 For one, the collective choice problem prevents shareholders from
caring about their single vote.224 Since there are millions of shares to be
voted, no single shareholder expects her vote to be decisive. As a result, no
voter has the appropriate incentives to vote their shares wisely.225 Each
shareholder believes that another will spend the time becoming informed,
so they forego the opportunity cost of becoming informed themselves.226
Since shareholders can increase the value of their votes and mitigate their
own collective action fears by aggregating a large mass of stock, smaller
voters can systematically exploit the work of larger shareholders.227 These
223. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248, 298-304 (1999) (discussing the relationship between directors and
shareholders and noting that corporate directors are not subject to the direct control by
shareholders as was once thought); Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007) (arguing that since proxy contests occur so
infrequently, “shareholders do not in fact have at their disposal [the] powers of corporate
democracy.”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996) (“As a matter of law,
shareholders, even taken as a collectivity, lack the control over directors that characterizes
an ordinary agency relationship.”).
224. Traditionally, the most common method of assigning votes to shares reflects “one
share, one vote” where each share is assigned a single vote. See One-Share-One-Vote Rule,
NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/o/one-share-one-vote-rule [https://p
erma.cc/K5MF-FJV6] (defining the one share, one vote rule). This is in contrast with
structures that assign multiple votes to a single class of shares, often referred to as dual class
voting stock. See Simon C.Y. Wang, Rethinking “One Share, One Vote”, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan.
29,
2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/01/rethinking-one-share-one-vote
[https://perma.cc/QQ2R-NF23] (questioning whether traditional one share, one vote regimes
can effectively combat the rise of activist short termism).
225. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 66 (suggesting that “voting rarely
serves any function except in extremis.”).
226. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 392 (describing the inefficiencies caused by the Free
Rider Problem); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 39-42 (describing the
costs of collective ownership through the lens of both decisionmaking and process).
227. I use the word mitigate rather than erase because no shareholder has the correct
incentives unless she owns the entirety of outstanding shares. Otherwise, a misalignment
will exist. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 67 (illustrating how even large
shareholders, while facing the collective action problem to a lesser extent, will never have
the right incentives unless they own 100% of the shares); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) (noting that even large investors
incur costs associated with voting and that the “reconcentration of ownership through
institutions adds only marginally to the value of the vote”). But see Alon Brav et al., Hedge
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shareholders can “free-ride” off of larger investors and by extracting rent
from the investment research of larger bloc holders.228 But investors with
the capacity to become large shareholders may be deterred from
accumulating blocs of shares due to this exploitation by the minority. The
cost of informing themselves to lessen the collective action problem may
be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and prevents even large holders
from casting informed votes.229 Shareholders still have incentives to
accumulate larger holdings, however, especially given the benefits of
control.230 Registering votes on a blockchain only serves to exacerbate the
issue: since voting tokens would be stored in a single public address on an
owner-by-owner basis, shareholders would be able to see exactly how large
blocs of shares are voted. Even if an argument can be made in favor of
greater transparency affording minority holders with more market
information, blockchain is not the means to satisfy the end goal. Large
shareholders are already doing this.231
Apart from the many issues facing the process of obtaining an
informed shareholder vote, standards of review for actions by the board
Fund Activism, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008)
(arguing that activist hedge funds reduce the collective action problem because they are
more willing to incur the costs of voting during proxy contests).
228. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 319, 349 (2012) (discussing the free-rider problem in the labor law context by
asserting that “[w]henever the benefits of group action are collective—they cannot be
provided to some without providing them to all—there is an incentive for a member of the
group to ‘free ride’ on the contributions of others and not join or support the group’s
efforts.”).
229. See CLARK, supra note 7, at 394 (likening this phenomenon to the classic prisoner’s
dilemma).
230. See id. (highlighting this offset, but noting that unfair treatment of large but not
controlling shareholders is likely to persist); Zetlin v. Hanson Holdings, 48 N.Y.2d 684
(N.Y. 1979) (discussing the benefits of control and allowing a controlling shareholder to sell
his control block for whatever price he likes without a duty to share the premium with the
minority). See generally Adolph A. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control,
50 CORNELL L. Q. 628 (1965) (analyzing various problems associated with the sale of
shareholder control).
231. E.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk
Losing Our Support, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/busi
ness/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/AC5N-K5XK]
(announcing the decision made by the chief executive of BlackRock to require companies to
contribute to society if they want to continue receiving BlackRock’s support); Ross Kerber,
Two Big California Pension Systems Oppose Nine Wells Fargo Directors, REUTERS (Apr.
21, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-accounts-calpers/twobig-california-pension-systems-oppose-nine-wells-fargo-directors-idUSKBN17N2MQ
[https://perma.cc/HY65-MAEG] (revealing how large shareholders of Wells Fargo planned
to vote against incumbent directors because of a phony account scandal).
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greatly expand the board’s decision making ability and undermine the
shareholder vote. The business judgment rule provides great latitude to
corporate directors if they make decisions on an informed basis in good
faith and on the honest belief that the actions taken were in the best interest
of the company, even if they acted negligently.232 This judicial standard
has effectively gutted many shareholder protections and renders a
shareholder vote of less utility.233 Even in a case where the business
judgment standard does not apply, directors may nevertheless be free of
liability for money damages in duty of care cases through clauses in
company charters.234 Inherently, the reduction in liability allows managers
to take greater risks—whether in the form of beginning new ventures that
promise high returns235 or bypassing the shareholder vote in situations
where one may be warranted. The problem is further aggravated when
director and officer (“D&O”) indemnification insurance is considered.
D&O policies are rather robust and cover for liabilities ensuing from
normal risk taking endeavors.236 When a board is taking a new risk,
considering a transaction using a structure that bypasses a shareholder vote,
or hiring a new officer, D&O insurance allows directors to proceed more
liberally rather than question their own actions or solicit approval from
shareholders.237 Blockchain voting may make it easier for directors to put
232. AM.LAW INST. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c); see Smith v. Van
Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the business judgment rule will not apply
in instances where the decision made was not an informed one); Kamin v. American
Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that a court will not interfere with
a director’s decisions unless they were made fraudulently or in bad faith); Daniel R. Fischel,
The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans-Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985)
(analyzing Van Gorkam and other applications of the business judgment rule).
233. See Blair & Stout, supra note 223, at 300 (claiming that the business judgment rule
undermines directors’ accountability to shareholders by insulating directors from claims of
the fiduciary duty of care).
234. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (allowing corporations to include a charter
provision eliminating liability for directors); 2 AM.LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19(c) (1994) (discussing the policy
rationale behind limiting liability). Other states have similar provisions. See generally
Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Director’s Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295 (1988) (analyzing
the various state statutes).
235. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 40 (noting that limited liability
generally empowers managers to undertake projects with a higher variance). Though
Easterbrook & Fischel refer to limited liability in the sense of share ownership, the analogy
to reduced or zero liability for manic managers remains viable.
236. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, in ROBERTA ROMANO,
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 282 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that D&O insurance covers a
wide array of potential liabilities apart those resulting from fraud or prior claims).
237. But see Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate
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matters to a shareholder vote, but it wouldn’t make any sense for them to
do so. The marginal cost savings they may achieve from a cheaper D&O
policy (assuming insurers even favor blockchain voting methods) will not
outweigh the cost of holding a vote, calling a shareholder meeting, and
sending out proxy mailings.
2. Shareholder Primacy is the “Dumbest Idea in the World”
If a company implements blockchain shareholder voting, they
implicitly believe in the power of the vote and thereby put the interests of
shareholders first—one doesn’t invest in shareholder voting without
inherently believing that the corporation should be run for the benefit of
shareholders.
But, there exist numerous theories on who are a
corporation’s ultimate beneficiaries—shareholders, employees, or society.
Many rationalize shareholder voting by pointing to a board’s legal duty to
maximize shareholder value.238 This is a misreading of basic corporate
principles. As Lynn Stout repeatedly retorts throughout her works, the
“notion that corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to
maximize shareholder wealth simply isn’t true.”239 Yet, practitioners
almost universally agree that shareholder primacy is the only way for
directors to run a corporation.240
Governance: The Director’s’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1813 (2006)
(finding that, all else equal, insurers “charge poorly governed corporations more for D&O
insurance than better governed corporations.”).
238. See, e.g., Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985) (requiring directors to get the best price for shareholders once a decision to sell the
company has been made); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (containing the opinion of Chancellor William Chandler that decisions of
corporate directors should “ultimately promote shareholder value”); NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP.
DIRS., REPORT OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DIRECTOR COMPENSATION 1
(1995) (“The primary objective of the corporation is to conduct business activities with a
view to enhancing profit and shareholder gain.”).
239. STOUT, supra note 7, at 25 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich.
1919)) (calling into question the popular reading of a seminal corporate law case by noting
that the aspect of running a corporation for its shareholders is “mere dicta”); see also
Paramount Commc’ns v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) (citing the seminal
case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (holding that
the board may consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders” when
taking defensive actions against a takeover)).
240. See STOUT, supra note 7 at 21 (“Shareholder Primacy had become a dogma, a belief
system that was rarely questioned, seldom explicitly justified, and had become so pervasive
that many of its followers could not even recall where or how they had first learned of it.”);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (2007) (noting
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To better understand this principal question, it remains important to
know the theory underlying the corporation.241 By far the most well-known
theory of the corporation, and the one this Article accepts, is that a
corporation is a set of legal fictions “which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among individuals.”242 These contracts are
formed between shareholders and managers, the corporation and its
suppliers, and the corporation and its customers.243 As with all contracts,
shareholders voluntarily decide to purchase shares and create the implicit
agreement that binds themselves with the corporation.244 This reciprocal
arrangement245 comes with the right to receive a pro rata portion of the
residual free cash flows of the enterprise and little more.246 The team
theory of governance recognizes that a board with consolidated power is
essentially the enforcement mechanism for the various contracts of the
corporation, both explicit and implicit.247 The dispersed interests of
shareholders, managers, and employees are best remedied by creating a
single entity that manages the interests of the team so it remains
cohesive.248
that the prevailing theory of shareholder primacy had nearly taken over managerial thinking
by the late 1990s and persists today); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310, 454 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (defining the corporate purpose in terms
of “maximiz[ing] shareholder value”).
241. See Lynn Stout, The Economic Nature of the Corporation, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343-48 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017) (listing theories such as the
entity theory, aggregate theory, and property theory and commenting on their strengths and
weaknesses); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (outlining the
various theories).
242. Michael Jensen & W. H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).
243. Here, I focus on the contracts between shareholders and the managers who operate
the corporation.
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 174-177 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)
(presence of duress or improper coercion eliminates the mutual assent necessary to form a
binding contract).
245. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822 (1998) (noting the
conception of a firm as a nexus of contracts really means that “the corporation is a nexus of
reciprocal arrangements.”).
246. See GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED
AMERICA 42 (2009) (“Buying shares in a company . . . entitles an investor to almost no real
influence on how the company is run, or by whom.”).
247. See Blair & Stout, supra note 223, at 280-81 (outlining the team theory of
governance).
248. Id. But see Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2002) (arguing that the team
theory undermines shareholders’ important managerial role of oversight).
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Still, the shareholder vote is often cited as a remedy for the agency
problem. This problem arises when constituents expend resources to
ensure managers or directors do not abuse their powers by serving
themselves rather than furthering the goals of the corporation.249 The vote
can be categorized as a monitoring cost for shareholders, who build agency
costs of ownership into their perceived value of the firm. Since
shareholders “price in” the impact of agency costs into their cost-benefit
analysis of firm ownership, share price is evidently a cheaper method of
holding managers accountable than voting.
The efficient market
hypothesis, some variant of which is accepted widely by most scholars,
postulates that stock prices incorporate market information.250 Since the
cost of voting can be learned via a corporation’s SEC filings, the costs are
likely embedded in listed prices. Economists view this method favorably,
especially when considering shareholders’ approval with a current price as
evidenced by their willingness to defer to the actions of the board rather
than running a proxy contest.251
Because share price is a foundational aspect when choosing to make
an investment, some have argued that it is better to provide shareholders
with greater authority over the board’s decision making so that directors are
properly incentivized to maintain shareholders’ satisfaction.252 However,
too much reliance on share price certainly would result in an incentive for
management to emphasize short-term gains over long-term performance.253
249. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 246, at 308 (1976) (noting that “it is generally
impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make
optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.”).
250. See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 122
(John Eatwell et al. eds., 1st ed. 1987) (describing variations of the market efficiency theory
that vary depending on the level of information reflected in market stock prices); Ronald J.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549,
554 (1984) (defining market efficiency as when “prices at any time fully reflect all available
information”).
251. See Tamara Belifanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value of Systems
Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 594 n.70 (2018) (discussing various
economists’ stances on the use of share price as a metric for reducing agency costs).
252. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for an increase in shareholder power with respect to
board power); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW 43 (2003) (supporting of an SEC proposal requiring companies to include shareholder
nominees to the board in their proxy materials).
253. See STOUT, supra note 7, at 66 (2012) (emphasizing that the average holding period
for U.S. stocks may be as low as four months, further encouraging managerial shorttermism); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 716-25 (2010) (observing managers’ tendency to
take greater risks in lieu of stable returns when shareholder power is increased); David
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Short-termism, or the focus on short-term growth, is an often used tool by
managers to stave off proxy battles, thereby reducing the number of
shareholder votes overall.254 Even if one considers it the primary goal of
directors to increase value for shareholders, the emphasis on short-term
gains may prevent managers from putting resources in value maximizing
projects with a long-term time horizon, such as a new pharmaceutical drugs
or artificial intelligence. As a result, many corporate executives have
referred to the focus on shareholder value as “the dumbest idea in the
world.”255 Judges are noticing the dangers of short-termism too: Chief
Justice Leo Strine has stated that shareholder welfare is best served by “that
course of action [that] will best advance the interests of stockholders in the
long run.”256
Primacy also includes frequently deferring to the wishes of
shareholders. A good avenue for this is the ability of shareholders to make
proposals on how the company should be run and submit them to a vote by
their fellow shareholders. But evidence shows that even allowing
shareholders to proffer and vote on proposals is actually anti-democratic.
Since most shareholders are passive and uninformed, they show little
interest in proposals, which are consistently defeated by large margins.257
Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1040 (2013) (arguing
that Bebchuk’s rationale for increasing shareholder’s power would bring about a “radical”
shift toward short-termism); see also Edward B. Rock, Adjusting to the New ShareholderCentric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1926-30 (2013) (discussing the detrimental
implications of shareholder primacy and short-termism on a corporation’s creditors).
254. See ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC. PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM 2 (2009),
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state09
09_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/386B-4XPB] (describing the risks created by focus on short-term
stock price and performance).
255. See Francesco Guerrara, Welch Condemns Share Price Focus, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 12,
2009), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1eHkdk
lrf [https://perma.cc/AD6N-C4QE] (quoting former Jack Welch, former CEO of General
Electric); Usman Hayat, Shareholder Value Maximization: The World’s Dumbest Idea?,
CFA INST. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://eic.cfainstitute.org/2014/10/23/shareholder-valuemaximization-the-dumbest-idea-in-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/C4XL-38LP] (noting that
many certified financial advisors oppose strong reliance on share price due to shorttermism).
256. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 764 (2015) (emphasis added); see
also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“the
discretion granted directors and managers allows them to maximize shareholder value in the
long term” (emphasis added)).
257. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 85 (“The reality is that the
shareholders’ proposal rule is an anti-democratic device . . . the majority must subsidize the
activities of the minority who are allowed to make proposals without incurring the costs.”).
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When managers acquiesce to the wishes of utterly uninformed voters, they
often sacrifice their business school certified knowledge in favor of an
action that may be more socially responsible, but nevertheless does not
provide the same wealth creation.258 Corporations are also responsible for
bearing the costs of sending shareholder proposals via proxy mailings, as a
result the majority end up bankrolling the minority’s proposals.259 This
methodology is incredibly inefficient. Why even allow shareholders to
make proposals? After all, questions of strategy and operations fall under
the gambit of “ordinary business.”260 Directors can merely ignore
shareholder proposals that receive an affirmative vote from the majority
since these votes are simply precatory and non-binding.261 Imagine the
uproar if directors spent millions creating a platform for voting and then
rarely, if ever yielded to the wishes of shareholders. Perhaps we would
learn whether blockchain voting would be valuable in the ensuing proxy
contest.
3. The Market Should Settle the Debate
Economic theory provides for an almost Darwinist approach to the
nature and structure of firms established for profit-seeking purposes.262
Over the course of centuries, even with the ever-present problem of agency
costs, the corporation persists to be the primary vehicle for enterprise.263
Specific corporate governance schemes are no different and, over time, the
history of corporations has been that firms who fail to adapt their
But see Donald Schwartz & Elliot L. Weiss, An Assessment of the Shareholder Proposal
Rule Proposal, 65 GEO. L.J. 635 (1977) (arguing that shareholder proposals have an indirect
impact on corporate manager’s behavior).
258. See generally DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION (1978).
259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (allowing bylaws that call for the reimbursement of
shareholders for proxy expenses); see also Gerry N. Wren, Expenses of a Proxy Fight—The
Problem of Reimbursement by the Corporation, 10 SW. L.J. 44 (1956) (noting that these
bylaws are widely adopted); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del.
2008) (evaluating a reimbursement bylaw). For a description of the economic inefficiencies
regarding payment for shareholder proposals, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at
85 (“the majority must subsidize the activities of the minority who are allowed to make
proposals without incurring the costs.”).
260. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
261. See DAVIS, supra note 246, at 42 (“Even if almost all shareholders voted in favor of
a particular policy . . . the board could legally ignore them, as such shareholder votes are
merely advisory.”).
262. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 3-8 (1994) (describing the
development of the firm due to market and economic forces).
263. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 4, at 11-17 (noting the rise of the corporation in
the United States).
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governance structures are eventually “ground under by competition.”264
While this Article has argued that using DLT for shareholder voting is not
necessarily a prudent use of corporate resources, a case can be made for
allowing public corporations to try out the technology and wait to see how
the market will react. Presumably, if the technology results in lower
transaction costs for shareholders, it will be adopted widely. If the reverse
is true, shareholders will be less willing to invest their capital in firms
utilizing DLT for voting thereby lowering the price per share of
corporations using the technology. When such events occur, viable
empirical data will be available to determine the real worth of DLT in
corporate governance.265
One notion in a traditional corporate governance regime is what has
become known as the “Wall Street Rule,” whereby shareholders either vote
in accordance with managers or sell their shares on the open market.266
This form of activism is cheaper than running a proxy contest and
managers, whose compensation is often tied to the stock price, are not
inclined to act in a way that will lead to a large sell-off by shareholders.
One consequence of using blockchain in securities clearing is that cheaper
and faster trade execution would likely make it easier for large shareholders
to sell their positions, thereby exacerbating the impact of a threat to sell.267
Since the threat will become more viable, large investors may resort to
placing a greater emphasis on exit as opposed to voice. The easier option
to exit makes market trends more important: if a corporation institutes
blockchain voting and a shareholder does not agree with the concept, they
are more likely to sell their shares than speak out against it.
Running a company in the twenty-first century requires managers to
264. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 13; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-18 (1985) (outlining competitive market forces).
But see RICHARD LEBLANC & JAMES GILLES, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM: HOW BOARDS REALLY
WORK AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 125 (2005) (“For every
company that one can quote as an example demonstrating a positive correlation between
good corporate governance . . . and good financial performance, another that followed very
good corporate governance practices can be found with a negative relationship.”).
265. See DAVIS, supra note 246, at vii (“Trust the market: it speaks with wisdom greater
than any of its participants.”).
266. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and Shareholder
Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2445, 2446 (2009) (articulating the
phenomenon of the Wall Street Rule).
267. Peter Rosenbloom, Frederik Schlingemann & Manuel Vasconcelos, Does Stock
Liquidity Affect Incentives to Monitor? Evidence from Corporate Takeovers, 27 REV. FIN.
STUD. 2392 (2014); see also Alex Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and
Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481 (2009) (noting that liquidity increases the credibility of
a blockholder’s threat to sell).
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frequently return to the market to raise new capital and a thriving market
for corporate control ensures managerial decisions don’t go off the rails.
However, many public companies today do not need to raise additional
capital and instead choose to finance new projects using retained
earnings.268 Thus, failure to adhere to shareholder interests does not harm a
company as one might think, save for a reduced share price. Even if
companies need to raise further capital via equity or debt, the increased cost
of doing so only affects the firm’s bottom line and, therefore, the additional
cost is borne primarily by shareholders.269 Many believe that a thriving
market for corporate control would provide boards with the proper
incentive structure to perform adequately,270 but existing legal norms
provide boards with a wide range of weapons to avoid takeovers.271 Since
boards are empowered to defend against takeovers, the threat of such offers
has less of an impact on the board’s decision making process.272 Actions
by directors in this area receive enhanced scrutiny by the courts, however,
making the market for corporate control a more viable method of keeping
directors in line with shareholder value maximization.273 Thus, in a world
where a board’s decision to implement blockchain voting is not received
well by shareholders, an outside actor can propose to take the firm over via
tender offer or statutory merger to give shareholders another option. The
vote to approve such a transaction could be among the first to use
blockchain.
Overall, market forces exist such that the decision of whether to utilize
DLT in shareholder voting should be left to boards. After all, if voting
were not worth the cost, “firms that eliminated voting would have
268. Bebchuk, supra note 223, at 715.
269. Id.; DAVIS, supra note 246, at 5 (“We have moved to a market-centered system in
which the corporations themselves . . . are guided by the gravitational pull of financial
markets.”).
270. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110, 112 (1965); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169
(1981) (discussing board responsibilities when receiving an unsolicited takeover offer).
271. See generally Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS
AND ACQUISITIONS (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1987) (explaining many defenses, including
staggered boards, super-majority voting provisions, poison pills, and standstill agreements).
See generally Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (allowing the use of
poison pills, or shareholder rights plans, in Delaware).
272. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) (allowing directors
latitude when responding to takeover bids so long as a threat to corporate policy is identified
and the board acts reasonably without being preclusive or coercive).
273. See generally Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(establishing enhanced scrutiny for director actions when responding to a perceived
takeover threat).
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prospered relative to others.”274 Perhaps the same is true of using
blockchains to manage the vote: if the benefits outweigh the costs of
implementation, companies will make the shift.
CONCLUSION
Distributed ledger technology provides an opportunity to reform an
otherwise chaotic and complex system of ownership that leads to voting
inaccuracies and increased costs to corporations. Using a permissioned
blockchain with tokenized “votecoins” allows for increased speed,
transparency, and accuracy of shareholder voting. However, shareholders,
managers, and regulators should understand the potentially negative
externalities posed by this technology. Managers can use blockchain to
speed up voting, manipulating shareholders and abusing their rationally
ignorant status quo. Blockchain voting also has the potential to be used as
a form of direct democracy, which would greatly undermine legal and
economic theory placing power in a board intermediary. This direct
democracy, while possibly reducing the principle-agent problem,
exacerbates the ever-present collective action problem that has plagued the
shareholder franchise since its implementation.
Corporations should be encouraged to sample DLT in their corporate
governance regimes, but we should continue to rely on the market to reveal
preferences of shareholders. After all, corporations are wealth maximizing
and will only implement the technology on a broad basis if perceived
benefits outweigh costs. This Article has voiced concerns, but has also
noted the potential capability of a securities landscape powered by
blockchains. As the technology becomes more universally accepted, it is
only a matter of time before managers and boards are faced with a decision
regarding implementation.

274. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 70.

